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THE SPECTRUM OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
 One contributor to the Oklahoma City Black Dispatch writing in 1958 recalled his 
effort to vote thirty years earlier. As he and a group of other blacks loaded up a wagon 
and attempted to vote in the ongoing election, the registrar fled in an effort to avoid 
recording their votes. After several hours in hot pursuit, the wagon finally caught up to 
the registrar and the group demanded to exercise their right to vote. The writer evok d the 
memory of the night saying, “When we finally did corner him, that ‘honest’ individual 
resigned his office right before our eyes. We did not get to register that nig t.”1 The 
registrar’s response reflected the difficulties that African Americans in Oklahoma City 
and Tulsa endured on a regular basis. Outright hostility rarely flared to the extent that it 
did in other Southern states. Instead, a continual refrain of political maneuver, avoidance, 
and delay persisted as the normal reactions of whites in response to black issues. 
However, the willingness of state and city officials to listen to the complaints of blacks, 
and the gradual shift from segregationist policies within the government to more 
egalitarian ones, helped increase the chances of a relatively peaceful, if arrested, political 
and social collaboration between the two races in Oklahoma City. 
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The period from 1954 to 1964 encapsulates the modern African-American civil 
rights movement from its revitalization following the Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, Kansas Supreme Court decision to the movement’s success in generating 
significant legislative change in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The outlawing 
of segregation in public education by the Brown decision began an era notable for the 
drastic amount of social change and by the animosity displayed by those who opposed the 
changes. The intervening decade also witnessed the beginnings of the sit-in movement, 
which challenged segregation in eateries and other public facilities. The succes  of the 
sit-ins led to other forms of protests including kneel-ins, ride-ins, and wade-ins that 
aimed to desegregate churches, amusement parks, and swimming pools.  
 This decade reveals as well the cracks in society exposed by new social trends and 
cultural movements. The civil rights movement launched the first salvo in an era notable 
for its contentions. Remembered for its consumer culture, conformity, and 
suburbanization, the trends of the 1950s also disguised the growing dissatisfaction of 
several groups over their stake and position in society. Beginning at the onset of World 
War II, a second “Great Migration” of African Americans gradually changed the black 
population of the United States from a largely rural population to an urban one. Much of 
this resulted from blacks eager to be employed at (better) positions left empty by men 
fighting in the war. As soldiers left their positions at factories and workshops throughout 
the North, blacks embraced the opportunity of a potentially higher income and a chance
at escaping the Jim Crow restrictions encountered in the Deep South. While many 
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African Americans chose to move to the North, Midwest, and West from the South, when 
soldiers returned after the war the same corporations that hired blacks unceremoniously 
dumped them. In the north blacks realized that while the segregation may not have had 
the official basis that it maintained in the South, the stigma of segregation still i fluenced 
everything they did.2  
 Blacks in Oklahoma mirrored this trend of moving into urban areas. The black 
towns formed in the territorial and early statehood period provided one source of people 
for this urban migration. Some of the towns failed to maintain their early succes in 
creating an enclave that provided equal rights and allowances for blacks. The racial and 
often geographic isolation that motivated African Americans to create separat  towns 
could lead to economic disjunction as well. The desolation of the area prevented much 
trade with other towns and forced the towns to be almost entirely economically self-
sufficient. The discriminatory policies of the government or of individual businesses 
outside of the towns increased the difficulty of economic interaction with other cities. In 
addition, the reliance on small farms and agriculture in black towns isolated them to an 
even greater degree. The landowners often produced items of necessity for themselves, 
further limiting the amount of interaction with other cities.3  
 This problem came to a head in Oklahoma even as late as 1954 when debates over 
the construction of the Turner Turnpike resulted in a dissatisfied black populace. The 
state government controlled the assigning of contracts and gave these contracts only to 
white business owners. Almost all white business owners still forbade African Americans 
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from entering their establishments in 1954. As a result, the awarding of contracts only o 
white business owners eliminated the likelihood that blacks would use the toll road. 
Blacks lacked motels to stay at and restaurants to eat in during their travels, and so they 
would plan routes that avoided the road.  Such frustrations led to blacks to demand: 
“What we want in Oklahoma and the South is government by law and not by 
compromise. Full and complete democracy by law and in its fullest sense would give the 
black man not only what he is getting in the dining halls on the Turner Turnpike, but 
inestimably more of the same quality of treatment everywhere in America.”4 
The Deep South, especially Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and the Carolinas, 
has received the majority of attention from scholars studying the civil rights movement, 
and understandably so. The region saw the largest number of demonstrations and also
experienced more intense reactions to the civil rights efforts than any other area. The 
Deep South also tended to enact harsher de jure and de facto segregationist policies than 
other states. Movement activities such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the marches on 
Selma and Birmingham, Alabama, and voter registration drives in Mississippi all 
occurred in the South, where the grossest violations of civil liberties for African 
Americans happened. Whites in the South maintained attitudes of racial superiority that 
drew from a long history of prejudicial treatment stemming from the era of black slavery. 
During and after Reconstruction, there was a brief promise of an increase in status for 
former slaves, soon followed by a reversion to the previous prejudicial attitudes. Literacy 
tests, poll taxes, and “grandfather clauses” all aimed to disenfranchise blacks, and 
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implementation of these preventative measures gradually eliminated almost l of black 
political participation in the South in the following decades.5 
Thus historians writing in the years immediately after the civil rights movement 
tended to focus on the entirety of the Southern portion of the movement. At the same 
time, the initial wave of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. scholars entered with studies that 
examined his life and politics and his interactions with the other leaders involved with the 
African-American civil rights movement in the United States. His place as the most 
recognizable and important of the leaders of the movement led to King being the focus of 
much of the initial scholarship of the movement. Offshoots of King studies typically 
traced his role in the founding of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) 
as well as the leadership of his and his successors. Two major works, David Garrow’s 
Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference and Adam Fairclough’s To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr., devote their pages to 
unwinding the inner workings of the organization and the personalities behind it. Both 
works struggle with understanding the organization’s successes despite its largely chaotic 
structure.  Bearing the Cross explores King’s initial reluctance in accepting a role as the 
movement’s head and the eventual relish that he displayed in leading the movement 
towards equal rights.6 As Fairclough explained the benefit of such an unsystematic 
approach to attacking racial injustice in the South, “What appeared to outsiders as chaos 
and inefficiency was often the inevitable consequence of flexibility, spontaneity, and a 
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capability for swift decision making and mobilization.”7  Taylor Branch does the best job 
of exploring King’s character and motivation in his trilogy that includes, Parting the 
Waters, Pillar of Fire, and At Canaan’s Edge. Branch identifies King as the most 
influential figure in American life of the last half century. Although repetitive at times, 
the intricacy and delicacy of Branch’s portrayal make it an essential study for students of 
the civil rights movement. King studies emerged as their own specific area of civil rights 
scholarship that continues in earnest to current times with books that explore specific 
aspects of King’s role in gaining African-American civil rights or attempt to examine 
new aspects of his life. Included in these works are Diane McWhorter’s Ca ry Me Home: 
Birmingham, Alabama, the Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights Revolution; Richard 
Lischer’s The Preacher King: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Word That Moved 
America; and Michael K. Honey’s monograph Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis 
Strike, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Last Campaign.8 The integral role that King played in 
the civil rights movement and the force of his personality ensures that books will 
continue to be produced on him even as other areas of civil rights research continue to 
increase in popularity.  
While Martin Luther King, Jr. is essential to the understanding of the civil rights 
movement, focusing solely on King and the SCLC can overlook others who helped form 
the Southern Movement during the 1950s and 1960s. August Meier and Elliott Rudwick 
offered the earliest comprehensive study of the Congress of Racial Equality with heir 
work CORE; A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968.9 Other works on CORE 
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place less emphasis on the group as a whole and instead center their research on either 
specific actions or locales in which the organization devoted their energies. The 
experiment by a mix of black and white protestors to ride a bus together throughout the 
south to challenge segregation statutes receives considerable attention from auth rs 
including works like Raymond Arsenault’s, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for 
Racial Justice.10 CORE and another prominent civil rights organization, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, often disagreed about the methods 
used by the other in trying to achieve equality. Despite its prominent place as th
organization founded first among those that played a significant role in civil rights, the 
NAACP only recently received a comprehensive examination of its activities during the 
civil rights era. Two works bearing similar titles were published in 2005 about the 
organization. Jonas Gilbert’s Freedom Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle Against 
Racism in America, 1909-1969 and Manfred Berg’s The Ticket to Freedom: The NAACP 
and the Struggle for Black Political Integration each attempt to distance the organization 
from its portrayal by other civil rights historians as heavily bureaucratic and inflexible.11 
Where other historians point to the rigidity of the NAACP as a key factor in the 
emergence of groups like CORE, the SCLC, and SNCC, Gilbert and Berg both argue that 
without the efforts made by the NAACP in the 1920s and 1930s at organizing those black 
liberals, radicals, and activists involved with the socialist, communist, early civil rights 
reform, and labor movement, the later civil rights organizations would never have 
attained the momentous successes that they did. The other major organization essential to 
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advancing civil rights in the South was the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC). The best work on the role that SNCC played in South is by noted civil rights 
and black power historian Clayborne Carson in his work, In Struggle: SNCC and the 
Black Awakening of the 1960s.12 A more recent work by Wesley Hogan discusses the 
emergence of SNCC as major influence for civil rights as well as otherdivisive issues in 
the 1960s including the Vietnam War.13  
In the early 1980s historians expanded the scope of investigation as social 
histories became popular. Examinations of specific states and communities and of their 
responses to different aspects of the civil rights movements ensued. Scholarship still 
focused largely on men, however, and roles of women in the movement often received 
little, if any, credit for their contributions. But after the late 1980s and early1990s, the 
study of civil rights splintered, and new areas of study emerged as scholars exp nded the 
scope of who had been affected by the movement and the regions where civil rights 
played a significant role. Traditionally, historians focused on blacks in the civil rights era, 
but the effect that the movement had on whites began to be examined further. Studies of 
civil rights generally also ignored northern and border states, like Oklahoma, but this 
changed during this period. 14 
Research on the civil rights movement in Oklahoma, however, is still limited, 
with most studies being article or chapter length. Graduate students attmpted the few 
longer studies of the civil rights in Oklahoma. Included in this group are many different 
investigations of school desegregation in the Oklahoma City school districts, its 
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effectiveness, and struggle to ensure that integration occurred quickly and efficiently. 
This group includes studies of the failures of school desegregation in Oklahoma City 
despite the pledges by the state government to ensure its implementation. The school 
desegregation studies encompass a variety of different degree programs including history, 
sociology, political science, public health, and education.15 I  addition to the 
aforementioned research scholars have studied topics linked to other aspects of civil 
rights in Oklahoma. Contained in this group are Louise Carolyn Stephens dissertation, 
“The Urban League of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,” June Ann Baker’s thesis, “Patterns of 
Black Residential Segregation in Oklahoma City: 1890 to 1960,” and John Henry Lee 
Thompson’s dissertation, “The Little Caesar of Civil Rights: Roscoe Dunjee i Oklahoma 
City, 1915 to 1955.”16 The only extended examination of the civil rights movement itself 
is James Gribble Hochtritt’s thesis, “An Absence of Malice: The Oklahoma City Sit-In 
Movement, 1958-1964.” This brief narrative asserts that the civil rights movement in 
Oklahoma City did not have the controversy over integration that other Southern cities 
did because of the generally positive relationships between the black and white 
communities. Generally, this study agrees with the assessment that less tension existed in 
Oklahoma than other Southern states. However, the good will repeatedly claimed by th  
other studies on the topic overlooks the dissension that certainly existed in Oklahoma 
leading up to and during the movement the movement. 
Tulsa, the other major metropolitan area in Oklahoma, has a unique position in 
African-American history because of the 1921 race riot that occurred there. Ev n before 
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the riot, the city had developed into two virtually separate communities, one black and 
one white. The black portion was referred to as Greenwood but also was known by its 
nickname “Black Wall Street.” The riot destroyed a significant amount of the area. The 
destruction and the subsequent rebuilding efforts by members of the black community are 
the primary subjects dealt with in the literature available on Tulsa’s African Americans. 
One of the earliest investigations that gave an in-depth treatment to the rit was Lee 
William’s 1972 work Anatomy of Four Race Riots: Racial Conflict in Knoxville, Elaine, 
Tulsa, and Chicago, 1921.17 Another early work is R. Halliburton Jr.’s 1972 study The 
Tulsa Race War of 1921 that first appeared in the Journal of Black Studies. The study 
examined the events surrounding the riot as well as its portrayal by local newspapers and 
politicians after the fact.18 Recent years have seen a spate of works that examine the 
memory of the riot by those who lived through it and the movement towards restitution 
by the city of Tulsa. These works include: James Hirsch’s Riot and Remembrance: The 
Tulsa Race War and Its Legacy, Tim Madigan’s The Burning: Massacre, Destruction, 
and the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, Eddie Faye Gates’ Riot on Greenwood: The Total 
Destruction of Black Wall Street, 1921, Hannibal Johnson’s Black Wall Street: From Riot 
to Renaissance in Tulsa’s Historic Greenwood District, and, probably the best work on 
the topic, Alfred Brophy’s Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921: 
Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation.19 Beyond works involving the riot, there are few 
studies that deal with African Americans in Tulsa. Eddie Faye Gates’s work They Came 
Searching: How Blacks Sought the Promised Land in Tulsa deals with the initial groups 
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of African Americans and how they arrived in Tulsa. The only other major work dealing 
with African American history in the city is Karl Lutze’s autobiographical work 
Awakening to Equality: A Young White Pastor at the Dawn of Civil Rights. Lu ze reflects 
on his placement by the Lutheran Church in Muskogee, Oklahoma and the interactions, 
there, and later in Tulsa, that led to his efforts in securing equality for blacks in 
Oklahoma.20   
My thesis occupies a distinct place in the civil rights historiography because of a 
unique combination of factors. Even though Oklahoma certainly displays a Southern 
attitude towards racial matters, the lack of a common Confederate heritage wh the rest 
of the Deep South lends to a cultural similarity more in line with that of border stats, 
particularly Kentucky, than that of Alabama, Mississippi, or Georgia.21  Even as the 
scope of civil rights literature continues to be expanded, research on civil rights in border 
states remains limited. The majority of the research done on border states remains article 
length. Almost all of these studies were written as community studies, with August 
Meier’s discussion of Baltimore civil rights,  “The Successful Sit-Ins in a Border City: A 
Study in Social Causation” being among the earliest of these investigations.22 Si ce 
Meier’s study, Baltimore has remained a popular city among those researching African-
American history. In Peniel Joseph’s collection Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at 
the Local Level, Kent B. Germany writes on the city in his article “The Pursuit of 
Audacious Power: Rebel Performers and Neighborhood Politics in Baltimore, 1966-
1968.”23  Another collection on Baltimore, organized by Jessica Elfenbein, Thomas 
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Hollowak, and Elizabeth Nix, culls together studies of the city encompassing everything 
from oral history, to school desegregation, to the investigation of the riot after Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in their book, Baltimore ’68: Riots and Rebirth in an 
American City24.  Another border city that has been investigated is St. Louis. In Daniel 
Monti’s A Semblance of Justice: St. Louis School Desegregation and Order in Urban 
America, the author investigates the manipulating of school districts to ensure the 
continuing segregation of students based not only upon race, but also upon class.25 While 
all of these works are important for the new scholarship produced on each city, the 
collective research on border states remains woefully underdeveloped.   
Beyond being in a border state, by paying attention solely to Oklahoma City nd 
Tulsa rather than the state as whole this study is linked with other investigations of 
specific communities. In focusing on these cities as a whole this study also refrains from 
concentrating on a single civil rights organization but instead examines the interplay 
between different organizations. In addition, this study examines local activists 
unattached to any of the major civil rights organizations that either acted ind pe dently 
or in conjunction with other similarly-minded unaffiliated citizens. The third factor that 
distances the Oklahoma City and Tulsa movements from those in other cities or states is 
that a woman provided the central leadership. This statement is not intended to denigrate 
the key roles of women throughout the civil rights movement. As other historians have 
demonstrated, women were integral throughout the black freedom struggle. Works like 
the essay collections Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil 
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Rights- Black Power Movement and African American Women Confront the West: 1600-
2000 as well as Merline Pitre’s monograph, In Struggle Against Jim Crow: Lulu B. White 
and the NAACP, 1900-1957 all examine the unique difficulties that women faced as they 
assumed leadership within the movement.26 
For the purposes of this thesis, Oklahoma will be included as a part of the South 
on the basis of its racial policies. Two pieces of evidence are key to the inclusio  of 
Oklahoma in the region. The first is that Oklahoma, along with the other southern stats,
border states, and the District of Columbia, required legal segregation in schools and 
public facilities prior to the Brown ruling . The fight to enforce Brown decision would be 
the basis for the majority of the racial conflict between blacks and whites in the years that 
followed.27 The second reason is the inclusion of Oklahoma within the South by the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights.28 Blacks in Oklahoma also referred to the 
state as southern. They applauded the action of the state’s officials in announcing their 
plan to obey the Supreme Court’s Brown decision in saying, “Oklahoma has outstripped 
every other southern state in its liberal thinking and action. This can be seen in the 
forward outlook taken in regard to school integration.” 29   
The civil rights movement forced the South to face a situation that had been long 
in the making. Blacks had reached a moment where their will to resist matched  slowly 
growing national sentiment that sympathized with the oppressed. The crossroads created 
a decision for southerners. Would they resist the growing tide and risk having their en ir  
way of life swept away in the roiling torrent? Or, would they rectify the wrongs of 
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centuries of mistreating African Americans as a subclass of humanity? For some, the 
bulwarks against any outside influence went up immediately. The memories of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, as periods when outsiders tried to destroy the “Southern way of 
life” bubbled to the surface. The deeply ingrained attitudes of self-sufficiency and 
regional solidarity created a bunker mentality for those who resisted changes in racial 
policies. Historian David R. Goldfield explains the similarities between th  a titudes of 
two different groups of southerners fighting for their way of life, each a century removed 
from the other: “The likelihood of outsiders - the federal government, Yankee reformers, 
philanthropic organizations - attaining a voice in the region was even more remote.” 
Others, who either embraced the humanitarian cause or recognized the futility of their
resistance to what would become a national enterprise, simply conceded to the 
overwhelming pressure.30 
Oklahoma, like other Southern states, aggressively defended the racial caste 
system established firmly in the aftermath of statehood. Whites meted out violence with 
aplomb following any incident viewed as upsetting the racial status quo, and the justic  
system seldom favored African Americans. Yet, the years between 1954 and 1964 in 
Oklahoma usually avoided displays of brutal opposition that disrupted many other 
southern states. Massive resistance -- the term adopted by pro-segregation white 
southerners in combating African American civil rights -- never reared its lf n either 
Oklahoma City or Tulsa with the same fervor as in other Southern states. The factors that 
precluded massive resistance from attaining the same hold in Oklahoma, a state with 
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similar values and attitudes as much of the South, is one of the primary explorations that 
reveals the deeper character of the leaders of both the civil rights movement and the 
government officials in each area. 
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A PRELUDE TO CHANGE 
 
  While Oklahoma exhibits a distinct mix of Southern sensibilities, its own unique 
history distanced the state from some of the less savory aspects of the region. Scattered 
throughout the history of Oklahoma were examples of segregationist laws, policies 
heavily influenced by Jim Crow, and cultural mores flavored by racist attitudes. 
Nevertheless, racism did not always represent the rule in Oklahoma. During the territorial 
period of the late-nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, racial 
discrimination existed but several factors minimized its effects. The relatively small 
population in the territory often necessitated that schools and other public institutions 
integrate. Schools and businesses could not maintain enough students to operate without 
interaction between different races essentially forcing cordial relationships between the 
groups regardless of personal feelings or enmity towards a specific race.31
 Blacks, who also comprised a significant proportion of the total population in the 
Oklahoma Territory, came to the area from the Deep South following the end of 




the Oklahoma Territory that Jim Crow laws elsewhere in the South prevented. Unlike the 
South, where sharecropping pushed African Americans into a different form of bondage, 
blacks in the Oklahoma Territory operated largely without outside interference.32 Of the 
13,225 black farmers in the state in 1900, 9,934 owned their own farms. Blacks actually 
represented a much higher percentage of farm ownership then whites did. Whites owned 
the property on which they farmed only 46.1 percent of the time in the Oklahoma 
Territory, while blacks owned 75.2 percent. Despite a larger number of blacks farm 
owners than whites, blacks struggled to exert similar economic strength as white farmers 
did. The size of the farms owned was the primary factor. Thirty-eight percent of black 
farms had fewer than fifty acres in 1910, but for white farms only eighteen percent had 
fewer than fifty acres. While these facts suggest that blacks could exercise more power in 
Oklahoma than they could in the Deep South, blacks displayed minimal ability to effect 
demonstrable political change in Oklahoma later decades.33 
 Demography alone could not create opportunity to exert influence in early 
Oklahoma history; newspapers provided another invaluable source of influence. 
Newspapers printed by African Americans flourished throughout Oklahoma during these 
years. Almost all of these papers appeared during the early days of Oklahoma’s 
statehood, but the majority fizzled out by the 1920s from a lack of sustained financing. 
Even though they only thrived for a brief period, over seventy different black newspapers 
printed installments.34 Oftentimes, the black press provided the only source of fair news 
coverage about African Americans, as white newspapers often relied upon steretyp s 
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and caricatures. Newspapers supplied an avenue for African-Americans to express their 
independence in an era where few opportunities to do this existed.35  In the years 
following statehood, the papers railed against injustices in the state, especially the 
legislature’s implementation three years after achieving statehood of a “grandfather” 
clause on voting.  The clause required that all persons who did not have a relative eligible 
to vote before January 1st, 1886, pass a test that demanded that the individual be able to 
read, write, and recall sections of the state constitution from memory.36 The amendment 
passed easily with a 35,000-vote margin of victory. This passage, from section 4a article 
3 of the Oklahoma State Constitution, remained in place until after the federal 
government outlawed literacy tests.37  The law stayed on the books in Oklahoma until 
1915. The United States Supreme Court finally outlawed the measure in its Guinn v. 
United States decision that declared that the law violated the rights of black citizens by 
effectively preventing blacks from participating in state elections.38  
 The Native American population also contributed to the difficulty in maintaining 
white dominance in the territorial period. The number of African Americans and Native 
Americans altered the common black/white racial dichotomy that governed the South. 
The inclusion of a third racial group made it clear that, “[the] biracial pattern was 
impossible in the Oklahoma Territory.”39  Counter to what might be expected from 
another minority population, Native Americans by and large harbored similar prejudicial 
attitudes as whites towards blacks. Given the harsh treatment of Native American tribes 
by the United States government, it shocked some that they in effect allied with their 
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previous, and sometimes current, oppressors in the Oklahoma territory. Oftentimes, the 
Native Americans displayed the same sense of disdain and belief in the inferiority of 
African Americans that the white settlers embraced. Both groups castigated bl cks as 
unreliable and lacking intelligence and believed these shortcomings burdened th  people 
surrounding them. 40 
 The treatment of blacks by Native Americans stemmed from the original 
relationship between the two races in the Deep South. When the United States 
government seized the land of the Native American tribes in the region, it forced the 
Natives to emigrate from their homes but tribes took the culture and traditions of the area 
with them. The Native Americans who practiced slavery in the South took their slaves
with them, effectively transplanting the practice into what became Oklahoma. The region 
being left under the control of the Native American tribes, the laws of the United States 
did not apply within Indian Territory. Thus, the Emancipation Proclamation and the 
subsequent amendments concerning slavery did not take effect until a full year after the 
end of the Civil War, when separate negotiations could take place.41  
Politically, the Oklahoma Territory differed significantly from the Deep South 
that many of the black migrants recently left. Different parties maintained political 
primacy in each region, and as each competed for supporters, African American needs 
were often the first items squeezed out in an effort to appease racist white voters. In the 
South Democrats maintained control, while the Oklahoma Territory leaned towards 
Republican rule during the years prior to statehood in 1906.  As larger numbers of 
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African Americans entered the territory enticed by promises of free land and a greater 
sense of equality, the Democrats saw the potential disruption that black rights could have 
within the Republican Party. The Democrats, unified in their opposition towards African-
American political participation, identified race as the crucial issue in the elections 
immediately before statehood. For members of the Republican Party, the position on race
issues became the crux on which many of the party members based their votes. The 
tensions over this issue resulted in the party splitting into factions over whether to support 
or reject the rights of blacks in the Oklahoma Territory. One faction retained the 
Republican title and insisted on aiding African Americans because of groups willingness 
to support the Republican Party. The splinter group based their politics around the racial 
issue and began calling themselves the “lily-white” Republicans to avoid any confusion 
among voters about their position on black rights.42  
 During the months preceding the first state elections in Oklahoma, Democrats 
spread rumors aiming to further damage the possibilities of Republican control of the 
legislature in the state’s initial election. Insistent in their efforts, the Democrats spread 
rumors that Republicans were importing Kansan blacks in order to skew voting results. 
Intent on smearing the other party, both groups attacked blacks. Murray Wickett 
describes the situation as, “The lily-white Republicans and the Democrats tried to turn the 
election campaign into a contest of racial slurs designed to prove which party hated the 
African-Americans more.” The questionable veracity of the Democrats’ clims 
notwithstanding, voters overwhelmingly elected the Democrats into control of thefirst 
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ever state Constitutional Convention, with the Democrats taking 99 of 112 possible seats. 
The combination of racist Democrats and lily-white Republicans in control of the iniial
Oklahoma state legislature signaled the beginning of the demise of the political rights of 
Oklahoma’s African-American population. And if the election of a Democratic 
legislature was the beginning of the demise, then the election of William “Alfalfa Bill” 
Murray as the president of the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention signaled the funeral 
dirge of black rights in Oklahoma. His influence on civil rights hung heavy over the state 
for the next half-century.43  
 Murray made his views on matters of race clear as soon as he was elected to his 
post as Constitutional Convention chairman. His acceptance speech claimed that blacks 
lacked the capacity to succeed in professional careers, and their shortcomings left only 
menial occupations such as porters, shoeshines, or barbers as suitable jobs for blacks.44 
The subsequent Constitutional Convention provided the legal backbone upon which Jim 
Crow would thrive in Oklahoma for next fifty years. At the convention, which ran from 
20 November 1906 to 15 March 1907, the participants included one significant piece of 
racial legislation that established segregated education in the new state. 45   
The status of African Americans in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s failed to improve 
from its low position during territorial and early statehood period. Statewide 
governmental policies still enforced legal discrimination while smaller towns frequently 
enacted harsher measures than those implemented by state government. These decades 
also witnessed violence erupt in clashes between whites and blacks. The lynching of 
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blacks by whites also continued, with the last recorded incident in Oklahoma occurring in 
1930 over the supposed rape of a white woman by a black man, Henry Argo. Even 
though the authorities thought that the woman’s case lacked any truth, a mob ripped off 
the door of Argo’s jail by chaining it to a truck. Despite the lynching of Argo, this 
signaled a new attitude towards blacks in Oklahoma. The authorities, including the 
National Guard, attempted to prevent the lynching rather than allow the mob to do as it 
pleased. Lynching, used to dissuade blacks from participation in politics, fell out of use
thanks to changes in laws. But while direct violence against blacks slowed, other indirect 
and nonviolent forms of discouragement emerged.46  
The political maneuvering between Democrats and Republicans in the later 
territorial and early statehood period of Oklahoma counted good racial relations between 
blacks and whites among its casualties. Blacks had migrated and settled in Oklahoma 
because of rumors of more equal treatment and a chance at political participation. The 
shattering of the hopes of the black settlers initiated the rocky relationship between 
whites and blacks that continued for over half a century afterwards. Black frustration at 
unequal treatment manifested even more now that a large number of black settlers cam  
to escape the harsh treatment that they had experienced throughout the Deep South. The 
decades following the achievement of statehood maintained these precedents an  led to 
the sustained situation in which blacks were treated as second-class citizens regardless of 
rights guaranteed them by the constitution.  
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The difficulties in Oklahoma, as throughout the South, arose from a fundamental 
lack of understanding between blacks and whites. James McBride Dabbs who served as 
president of the Southern Regional Council, an organization created to promote racial 
equality, eloquently explored the disconnect between the reality of the situation and what 
many people thought was the reality, in his address to the council in 1961, explaining, 
“with a strong sense of being southern, we lack a vision of what the South is.” He 
continued, “We have already in the South one or two partial visions but nothing that 
encompasses the whole.” What Dabbs understood well before many political, 
community, and social leaders was that the future of the South depended as much on 
blacks as it did whites. Even if one race had come up from slavery and submission to the 
other, the South would be lacking an integral part of what made it southern if blacks left 
the region because of continued prejudicial treatment. He later stated, “However much 
the institution of slavery may have expressed at one time the vital life of theSouth -- and 
I don’t know how much it did -- that time is gone. The life-blood seeps from the 
institution, Negroes cease to obey it, whites cease to enforce it.” This sentiment applied 
even more to Oklahoma than it did to other southern states. In the deep South, the most 
severe battles that would be fought over civil rights still waited. In a decided ontrast, the 
Oklahoma City civil rights movement accomplished their initial goals and had moved on 
to secondary aims by 1962.47  
Oklahoma courts in the 1940s and 1950s became a battleground as Roscoe 
Dunjee, the editor of the primary black newspaper in Oklahoma City, the Black Dispatch, 
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brought in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Chief 
Legal Counsel Thurgood Marshall to discuss the possibility of beginning desegregation 
in the state. As time went by, the group set forth a plan attempting to enroll a black 
student at the University of Oklahoma knowing that that the university would prevent the 
student from starting courses there. Upon hearing about the intended legal challenge, 
University of Oklahoma president George L. Cross referred to the action as “dynamite” 
for its potential national implication. The university’s Board of Regents certainly 
recognized the potentially explosive reactions that the case could generate across the 
state. They pushed their next planned meeting forward a week to address the issue, and 
their stand on the issue was little surprise, the group voted unanimously to deny 
admission “to anyone of Negro blood.”48   
The University of Oklahoma Board of Regents had reason to be confident in their 
stance. The Oklahoma legislature had passed laws in 1941 that further limited the 
possibility of integration in the state’s schools. The law stated that it was a mi demeanor 
to educate children in mixed race schools or classrooms, and it also established a 
financial penalty of five hundred dollars for any school official who broke the mandate. 
However, the NAACP would not be that easily dissuaded and found Ada Lois Sipuel, the 
student who would help the organization pursue its test case. After searching throughout 
the state for a candidate that met the standards of the NAACP search committee, they 
decided on a recent graduate from Langston University. The young woman tried to gain 
admission to the Oklahoma Law School since the black college in the state, Langston 
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University, did not have a law school. Intent on challenging the school segregation ruling 
established by Plessy v. Ferguson, Sipuel along with Roscoe Dunjee and Dr. W. A. J. 
Bullock scheduled a meeting with University of Oklahoma president George Lynn Cross 
in Norman on January 14, 1946.49 Cross, accompanied by Professor Royden Dangerfield, 
met with Sipuel to discuss the possibility of her admittance to the University of 
Oklahoma. After confirming that Sipuel’s transcript met the requirements of the law 
school, Cross pulled out a prewritten, typed letter from his desk that had been forwarded 
to him from the governing board of all state colleges and universities. The letter told 
Cross that under no circumstances should he admit an African American to the 
University of Oklahoma. Despite the orders from the board preventing Sipuel’s 
admission, Cross sympathized with Sipuel and her cause. He then promised to write a 
letter that affirmed that race provided the only reason behind preventing Sipuel’s 
admission the college. Cross could easily have claimed that the university’s refusal of 
Sipuel’s application resulted from Langston’s lack of accreditation. His assertion that it 
solely was based on race allowed for NAACP to legally challenge the decision.50 
The years following World War II changed perceptions among blacks. Blacks 
fighting side-by-side with whites came back to find that this had changed nothing in 
social conditions in the United States. Historian Jimmie Lewis Franklin explained, “The 
performance of black soldiers on the battlefields and the patriotic support of black 
citizens on the home front argued well against an old system that kept racism alive and 
held blacks to second-class citizenship in America.”51 Whites still saw blacks as 
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subservient and unequal despite having courageously served their country. African-
American veterans made frequent arguments about their willingness to die for one’s 
country but inability to receive equal service at a restaurant, hotel, or business o ce they 
returned. This theme, where black soldiers fought often for whites, would continue in 
other wars especially Vietnam.52 
Similarly, the affluence of the United States following World War II aroused a 
desire in blacks for economic well-being that up to this point had eluded them. While 
ownership televisions, radios, and home appliances all required some expendable income, 
blacks clearly aspired towards a more substantial measure of financial equality. Blacks 
desired home ownership as they viewed such a substantial purchase as evidence of their 
growing financial and social equality. This proclivity arose from several factors. Beyond 
allowing for some sense of security, home ownership allowed choice for blacks and also 
provided some sense of social equality between blacks and whites. But even though a 
strong desire for home ownership arose among African Americans, the reality of the 
situation resulted in a geographical limitation on where blacks could buy houses. In 
Oklahoma City beginning in the 1920s, “Northeast 4th Street served as a boundary, north 
of which no Negro could live, or own, or operate a business.”53  However, after the City 
Council abolished the segregation ordinance that had established this boundary, whites 
began informally discouraging blacks from moving into their neighborhoods, without the 
support of the city government. When one family moved into a neighborhood on NE 7th
Street an unknown assailant exploded a bomb in their home. This racist behavior only 
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served as a temporary deterrent, and black migration into all-white neighborhoods 
continued. As the black community grew in population, it continued to expand 
geographically as well, and the state fairgrounds became the next unofficial border for 
black neighborhoods. This expansion often led to run-ins with white neighbors who 
viewed it as a prelude to sagging housing prices and a plunging standard of living.  Once 
the legal restrictions that prevented blacks from moving outside of prescribed areas were 
overturned in 1953, heated exchanges over whether a neighborhood should allow black 
residents became a common sight in neighborhood associations and community 
gatherings. Violence, “panic selling” and “blockbusting” all became methods to either 
avoid or discourage integrated neighborhoods in Oklahoma City.54  One Oklahoma City 
woman voiced the opinion of many in the white community regarding blacks becoming 
their neighbors: “I guess there’s sort of a social stigma. You don’t want your friends 
driving through a colored section to get to your home. I can’t explain it, but I feel that 
way.”55    
 As years went by, the attitudes of Oklahoma City whites softened concerning civil 
rights for blacks, but the reality of housing reflected the housing practices of previous 
decades. Whites continued to chafe at the possibility of blacks moving into the 
neighborhoods and discouraged African Americans from purchasing homes in the same 
developments. A pamphlet of the League of Women Voters provided evidence of this 
stagnation in the housing situation when they detailed in their report that “With the 
exception of two areas (one just south of the downtown business district and one just 
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north of Reno between Western and Indiana), Negro residents are confined to an area est 
of Santa Fe and north of the Canadian River. This area as expanded from 4th Street in 
1920, to 23rd Street in 1959, and 50th Street in 1963.”56 The expansion of areas available 
to blacks for rental or for purchase, while important, did nothing however to improve the 
condition of the homes available. A survey discovered that among homes occupied by 
African Americans 48 percent could be considered as “deteriorating” or “dilapi ated.”57 
Another report noted “Negro housing kept growing worse and higher priced, approaching 
slum status.”58 Despite these facts, no fair housing laws would be passed in Oklahoma 
City until it became federally mandated by a direct presidential executiv  order from 
Lyndon Johnson in 1968.   
The racial segregation within Oklahoma City mirrored the situation throughout 
the South. Blacks and whites generally associated with people of their own race, and the 
limited interaction between the two groups often conformed to social expectations hat 
clearly placed whites over blacks. Throughout the nation segregated schools were the 
norm, but Oklahoma perpetuated the segregation on an organizational level as well. 
Oklahoma retained the only schools in the nation where black and white schools had 
separate budgets. By funding each group of schools individually and solely on the basis 
of race, Oklahoma officials had little basis on which to argue and made it difficult to 
escape the effects of Brown v. Board of Education.59 Upon word of the decision, state 
superintendent Dr. Oliver Hodge displayed a balanced reaction with his main concern 
being the feasibility of a rapid implementation of a new schooling plan, rather than the 
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mixing of black and white students or faculty. He commented to The Daily Oklahoman, 
“If we don’t have to do anything about it until a year after September 1, it will be all 
right, but if we had to do something about it before September 1 this year, we would be in 
bad shape.”60 The statement reassured the African American population of Oklahoma 
City that the school district intended to fully obey the decision set down by the Suprme 
Court, even if the implementation was delayed.  
The early state attitudes on interracial neighborhoods forced blacks into certain 
geographical areas within the city. Even though no legislation forced blacks to stay in a 
certain area, many de facto policies prevented blacks from moving outside of certain 
areas. As a result of white pressures, both legal and illegal, blacks formed their own 
community within the community. This result should be expected considering schools, 
neighborhoods, restaurants, public transportation, and workplaces all either remained 
segregated or had only recently been desegregated. Blacks maintained their own 
newspapers, including the Oklahoma City Black Dispatch and the Oklahoma Eagle based 
in Tulsa. Oklahoma City also had a radio station, KBYE, which focused its programming 
on the black community, informing the public about concerts, cotillions, dances, revivals, 
and sporting events. These two methods afforded the black community with some of the 
only methods of disseminating information available to it. The major media outlets, th  
three local televisions networks, The Daily Oklahoman ewspaper, and the city’s radio 
stations, often focused on the events and concerns of the white community.  Whites 
ignored many things that African-Americans might find relevant and, in return, blacks 
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often responded by closing the ranks to their own community. The actions of both groups 
resulted in the same thing, a city divided into two distinct social communities.61  
Throughout the early 1950s Oklahoma remained unconcerned about constructing 
any progressive initiatives pertaining to race relations. Governor Johnston Murray, 
elected in 1951, did not publicly embrace the crude racial convictions that his father, 
William “Alfalfa Bill” Murray, advocated. Instead, Johnston Murray contented himself 
with holding office and making very little efforts at effecting change of any sort. The 
younger Murray had never held an elected office before being elected to the g vernorship 
and this lack of experience with politics, combined with the fact that “[Murray] w s 
given to indecision and vacillation at critical moments,” made his governorship 
unremarkable except for his stance following the Brown decision. While other governors, 
senators, and mayors bellowed their disapproval, planned to ignore the decision, and tried 
to strip the Supreme Court justices of their authority, Murray continued his policy of 
following whichever avenue resulted in the least amount of work for him and quietly 
agreed to follow the dictates of the Supreme Court concerning the Brown decision. 
According to Murray, “there was no reason for assembling the legislature in th matter of 
compliance with the high court ruling.” The Black Dispatch also reported, “he indicated 
very definitely Oklahoma would accept integration of whites and blacks in the schools 
without any trouble.” Following the lead of the governor, state officials began preparing 
for the integration of state schools.62 
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Despite the statements by Governor Murray claiming that Oklahoma would obey 
the ruling of the Supreme Court, his assurances changed when he left the state. While on 
a trip to Dallas, Texas in July of 1954, the governor explained that he expected 
Oklahoma, “to school its white and Negro children separately-yet legally comply with 
anti-segregation edicts.” Using his status as a 1/16th Chickasaw Indian to claim solidarity 
with blacks, Murray went on to say, “I’m very much for liberalizing exchange of students 
between districts. That’d let the whites go to white schools and the colored to colored 
schools. And I speak as a member of a racial minority.”63 Interestingly, this statement 
foreshadowed the exchange of students in Oklahoma City as well as throughout much of 
the South. The obvious difference between the suggestion of Governor Murray and the 
later system that transferred students between districts is that the later system used the 
exchange to integrate schools rather than segregate them. Murray further damage  his 
relatively positive relations with the black community as he continued his speech. He 
then focused on teachers, “Where white teachers are available to hire, they’ll be 
preferred. I don’t know of any law in the world that can tell a school board who it can 
hire.” To complete his offending of the black populace Murray then attacked integration 
as a whole, outlining his belief that, “A person who insists on shoving himself in where 
he is uninvited is going to be ostracized. To me segregation is a mental attitude of the 
individual. Change must be evolutionary and not revolutionary.”64   
   Murray’s statement highlighted a growing frustration among blacks about the 
governor’s position on civil rights. However, the anger of the black citizens did nothing 
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to discourage the governor from displaying his indifference to the plight of African 
Americans. Rather than trying to repair the damage to his relationship with the black 
community Murray continued his verbal onslaught against the Brown decision 
explaining, “I don’t believe in forcing people to do something they don’t want to do.”65 
Fortunately for Oklahoma’s African Americans, Murray had been voted out of office by 
the end of 1954. Yet the Brown decision that generated so much excitement among the 
African-American community dissipated quickly as blacks realized that the Supreme 
Court could do little to force the implementation of their verdict in Oklahoma. While 
there were few hopes of a quick and easy solution to a centuries-long problem of racial 
prejudice, the jubilation that blacks initially felt because of the victory of the Brown 
ruling gave way to the understanding that the issues surrounding integration had little 
hope of being solved as quickly as they desired. The Black Dispatch called the dismissal 
of the doctrine of separate but equal “more significant and momentous than the Dred 
Scott decision,”66 but it clearly showed a sense disappointment when President 
Eisenhower, “stated very definitely last week that his administration is puttng forth no 
effort to support legislation for any particular or special group of any kind.”67 This 
statement tempered the excitement of blacks that hoped that equality waited in th  near 
future. At the same time, now that blacks had legal backing they could expect some kind 
of support if they brought a case to court. Other segregationist policies now appeared 
precarious, and challengers of the policies became more willing to defy measures that 
they viewed as undemocratic or immoral. As political challengers to Governor Murray 
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began to speak out in 1954, blacks expressed their frustrations as well, saying “What we 
really need in Oklahoma is a civil rights law which requires all persons who operate 
public facilities to give uniform treatment to all American citizens who enter their 
doors.”68 This sentiment germinated over the course of the next year as obstruction of 
civil rights legislation continued on city, state, and national levels.  
  Raymond Gary supplanted Johnston Murray as governor in January 1955, and 
inherited a wealth of problems from the former governor. Despite the lack of action on 
civil rights during his governorship, Murray did not leave unaware of the mess he left to 
his successor, remarking that Oklahoma had “[a] staggering maze of unresolved pr blems 
which shame my state and hold it in the category of the retarded.”69 The biggest problem 
for Gary would be how to consolidate the budgets of black and white schools into a 
single one. Fortuitously, Gary’s approach to school integration reflected the sam  
dedication to a peaceful transition from segregated to desegregated schools that Murray 
espoused. While running for governor, Senator Gary pledged, “I’ll not only enforce this 
decision of the Supreme court, if I am elected governor and any other directive of that 
august body. I think any public official should regard the oath he takes to support the 
constitution of the United States when elected to office, as a sacred obligation and 
trust.”70 Behind these good intentions, Gary tackled the enormous task of incorporating 
two types of schools, each being financed separately and by different methods, into a 
single unified school system. The white schools received funding based upon a budget 
prepared by each district, with additional money being provided by the state. The state 
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funded black schools by using a four-mill tax within each county that contained a black 
school and again any supplementary money came from the state. To accomplish this, the
governor packaged all of the changes to the schools into one bill that he titled the “Better 
Schools Amendment.”  By the time the Supreme Court issued their verdict on the second 
Brown case with its conclusion that schools should be integrated “with all deliberate 
speed,” the Oklahoma voters had passed the 1954 bill with an overwhelming majority of 
231,097 for to 73,021 against.71 
 The quick support of the Supreme Court decision towards desegregation of 
Oklahoma schools displayed the wide contrast in attitude towards government civil rights 
policy between the state and the rest of the South. Residents throughout the South waited 
to see which government official would be the first to challenge the ruling ending 
segregation. Several governors decried the decision as government intervention into an 
area where they were not needed, nor wanted. Charging that integration of schools (and 
later other institutions) threatened the very way of life that Southerners had enjoyed for 
decades, public figures railed about their intent to ignore the ruling until the federal 
government forced them to do otherwise. Some went beyond this declaration and 
announced their plans to resist even if the government attempted to force the South to 
obey the Brown decision. The efforts to integrate Central High School in Little Rock, 
Arkansas brought national attention to the struggle to implement the Supreme Court 
ruling. Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus opposed the Supreme Court’s directive and 
ordered the National Guard to prevent black students from attending the school. While 
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Faubus’s actions appear drastic, they were not outliers when examined in conjunction 
with the behavior and statements of other Southern politicians. Soon after the opposition 
to federal policy began in Arkansas, Mississippi Governor J.P. Coleman weighed in on 
the issue of segregation on the national television program Meet the Press. He expressed 
his belief that “A baby born in Mississippi today will never live long enough to see 
integration.”72 When compared to the statements of Oklahoma officials who asserted the 
need to obey the rulings of the court, the differences between the two illustrated how 
Oklahoma politicians wanted to remove themselves from the uproar being raised 
throughout the rest of the South. The governors of Oklahoma often went out of their way 
to display their willingness to cooperate with blacks, even going as far to visit the black 
high schools in the area to speak, or to invite prominent black citizens to state parties as a 
show of goodwill and to potentially attract black voters.73  
Despite the increasing interest shown by politicians in the welfare of the state’s 
blacks, Oklahoma City reflected the state’s racial bias by continuing to exclude blacks 
from party politics. The lily-whitist portion of the state’s Republicans held a dominant 
position in the Oklahoma City area that continued into the 1950s. Democrats shunned 
black voters altogether.74  The success of the whites in ensuring their own continued 
dominance was apparent. Alan Saxe, a graduate student researching desegregation in 
Oklahoma City, wrote “The Negro was so effectively isolated from the stat’  political 
scene that none had ever served, from 1907 to the mid-1960s, in the state legislature from 
the Oklahoma City area.”75 By the beginning of 1954, the almost entirely white political 
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parties began to make attempts to incorporate blacks into their parties. The Republican 
Party in Oklahoma tried to gain the support of the black community first. They criticized 
the Democrats for passing a bill that required blacks to identify themselves as such on a 
ballot if they intended to run for public office in Oklahoma. The Republicans resolution 
passed “without a dissenting voice” at a municipal meeting that 3,000 party members 
attended. Though seen by some as simply good politicking by the Republicans after the 
Democrats had moved to fully integrate during the previous election, the actions of each 
party demonstrated that they understood the growing importance of the black vote for 
their respective success in future elections. 76   
While ever since Oklahoma had achieved statehood whites certainly had tried to 
prevent blacks from obtaining political power, blacks often failed to embrace the 
opportunity at political participation once the opportunity opened to them. Blacks who 
were both registered and had voted in 1954 numbered only 10 percent. The more 
frustrating aspect for many Oklahoma City blacks who voted was the knowledge that 
across the nation restrictions or threats of violence prevented blacks from exercising this 
right. Some people attempted to address this problem head-on by asking, “Is this not a 
sad commentary upon Negro leadership in Oklahoma, where all that is necessary to 
qualify for suffrage is to exercise enough energy to walk or ride to the registrar’s 
home?”77 Interestingly, this same “Negro leadership” often included the same group of 
people who exhorted others to register to vote. Throughout the community the effort of 
the black leaders seemed to exist. It just appears that the effectiveness of their rhetoric in 
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inspiring action seems to be lacking. The leaders in the movement expended large 
amounts or energy and dedicated much of their free time to the civil rights cause only to 
be disappointed when the general population responded indifferently. Joe Brooks, 
proprietor of the Silver Star Sundry store reflected the view of the Black Dispatch on this 
problem when he wrote, “All of the Negroes who come into my place of business who 
shout about being race men, are halted immediately and I will not hear them unless they 
can produce a registration certificate for voting and a this year’s NAACP card…I don’t 
want to hear a lot of gush that is backed up with nothing more than an empty pair of 
leather lungs.”78 Brooks reported that two-thirds of the people who came in had nothing 
else to say after he announced his requirements for listening to them. Black leaders did 
make efforts to remedy the problem of people not using their vote. Perhaps naively given 
the previous voter turnouts, they hoped to register fifty percent of the adults eligible to 
vote. To do this, all of the city churches held meetings after their services, to “stress the 
importance of Negro registering and preparing for use of the ballot during the primary 
and general elections this year.”79 Reality reared its head following the conclusion of the 
voter registration drive at the end of March when L.B Nutter, the chairman of the
Oklahoma County Democratic Precinct Association, reported that only about half of
those African Americans who had previously registered to vote had reregistered by the 
cut-of date. Any progress that the voter registration drives made could now only be seen 




African Americans in Oklahoma City still struggled to break free of the influe ce 
of historical prejudicial voting policies even in the 1950s. The remnants of the earlier
efforts to prevent African-Americans from voting still remained, and despite myriad 
attempts at motivating blacks to vote more often the not the pleas of community leaders
for empowerment through participation led to little change in voting patterns. Addressing 
the problem during a speech in Oklahoma City, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. scolded the 
city’s residents for their lack of voting in recent elections, “You’re not voting like you 
should…you’re doing yourself a grave injustice when one of the most significant steps 
you can take is that short walk to the voting poll.”81   
At the same time that the voter registration drives were going on in the black 
community, the state government provided an interesting look at the sometimes 
contradictory attitudes towards African-American rights within the state. While the state 
senate approved a bill that forbade discrimination in employment based on “color, creed, 
or ancestry,” the state capitol and the Oklahoma County courthouse still had restrooms 
segregated by race.82 Signs adorned the doors making it clear that they existed only for 
“White Gentlemen” or “White Ladies,” while the restrooms available to African 
Americans were located in the basement of each building. These two restrooms al ng 
with one other in the Union Bus Station provided the only places for an African 
American to relieve themselves in the whole of downtown Oklahoma City. Situations 
like this one seemed to play out in Oklahoma City and across the nation quite frequently. 
A grandiose statement made in a speech or passed into law failed to realize the 
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segregation of the most basic of human activities. A disconnect between the two races 
certainly still existed, and blacks continued to try to alter this through legislation.83  
Blacks frequently dealt with figures in local government either opposed or 
indifferent to the efforts towards equality that African Americans made in the late 1950s. 
According to scholars Numan Bartley and Hugh Davis Graham, Oklahoma, like its 
surrounding states, had a “tradition of white southern ethnocultural unity that…had 
shielded the region from outside intervention in social arrangements in social 
arrangements and in large part had protected entrenched elites from the vicissitudes of 
mass democracy.” Government officials often reacted slowly to black concerns if they 
acknowledged them at all. The feeling of powerlessness that resulted frequently 
dissuaded blacks from social and political activism or seriously lessened their efforts in 
either.84  
The local and state government also perpetuated racist policies. The government 
positions available to blacks were primarily service or custodial positions. As a result, 
positive career advancement only existed on a limited basis. The few blacks hired by th  
government occupied the lowest positions available, and stayed at a similar level for th  
entirety of their tenure while on the state’s payroll. After being told and observing these 
biased hiring policies by state and local government agencies, the Labor and Industry 
Committee of the state NAACP branch decided to investigate the depth of the 
discrimination in employment practices. After examining eight state agencies, the 
NAACP committee discovered compelling evidence regarding discriminatory hiring 
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practices within the Oklahoma state government. Of the 6,500 government posts 
potentially available to African Americans, blacks actually occupied less than one percent 
of the positions.85 In addition, the leaders of two of the eight agencies interviewed openly 
admitted to racial discrimination, while another said, “We hire according to the race. That 
is our policy.”86 The NAACP obviously took umbrage with any government office 
unapologetically enacting racist policies. Beyond the unflinching racism being displayed, 
the government exclusion of blacks from state employment eliminated yet another sector 
of the job market in which blacks could not have an occupation.  
Frequently the government gave blacks hope in significant positive change in the 
rights given to them, only to dash these new expectations just as quickly as they came 
about. When Governor Raymond Gary announced that the Oklahoma National Guard 
would be desegregated in 1958, the black press commended the action immediately. 
However, the press tempered their reaction with hesitancy of the motivations behid the 
action, “There will, of course, arise the surmise that enrollment in the guard is  political 
move calculated to benefit some particular candidate. On the other hand, it can be 
considered as evidence that integration is strongly rooting itself in the political soil of 
Oklahoma.”87 Even given the welcome news of the state government acting against 
segregation blacks still expressed concern about the factors behind the decision. The hope 
that blacks had that, “the entire attitude of the state has completely changed about 
integration,” was dashed a little over a month later when the African-American 
community learned that the integrated unit, the 45th infantry division, no longer existed. 
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The federal government planned to disband the 45th after they failed to gain enough 
volunteers to operate at full strength. This would have obviously prevented the 
desegregation of the National Guard.88 However, protests by Oklahoma Governor 
Raymond Gary and the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce helped convince the 
national government of the importance of the 45th Infantry Division to the economics and 
military readiness of the nation, and the federal officials backed off their plan to disband 
the group.89 In the days leading up to the government’s final decision, an addition of 350 
volunteers to the 45th Division, including 42 blacks, pushed the group up to 90 percent of 
its required strength and helped prevent its dissolution while at the same time 
desegregating the military in Oklahoma.90 
Much of the misunderstanding, and often outrage, surrounding the efforts towards 
eliminating discrimination came about because of innuendo and fear centered on black 
sexuality. Long-held beliefs of black sexual predation throughout the South frequently 
influenced decisions regarding desegregation and integration. Racist policies aros  b sed 
on the assumption that white women needed protection from potential sexual attacks 
from black men. This so-called “rape myth” perpetuated the idea that blacks lacked ny 
sort of restraint when it came to sexual behavior. This, in turn, led Southern whites to 
believe that if black men could not contain themselves sexually, that some other metod 
needed to be used to enforce the corrective behavior upon them. Previously, slavery 
provided an easy and already established method of preventing the alleged sexual 
assaults. After emancipation, blacks, no longer under the control of their masters and 
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overseers, could move about freely without fear of punishment over any minor infraction. 
In the words of historian Diane Miller Sommerville, “Having come of age without having 
experienced the moral strictures of slavery, the New Negro, in the view of race radi als, 
was reverting to his natural, bestial state.”91 In the view of some racist white Southerners 
a new form of social control needed to be introduced to continue white dominance in the 
region. 92  
Lynching became the new method of intimidation in the South. Its extralegal 
implementation allowed for retribution from alleged sexual misconduct to be swift,
needing only the hint of black-on-white violence to put into motion a crowd of angry 
whites. Rarely did those accused of attacking a white woman receive fair tr atment. 
While not a guaranteed death sentence, frequently racist attitudes combined with being in 
a position of power put whites in control of the fates of the accused blacks. Despite 
whites controlling the means of punishment, they seldom waited for a guilty verdict to be 
handed down. For example, the rumor of sexual misconduct by a black male could incite 
a frenzied reaction among whites eager for any opportunity to reassert their superiority in 
the social hierarchy. This attitude, while certainly lessened over the passage of time, still 
pervaded the thoughts of Southerners, including Oklahomans, whenever a rumor about 
the rape of white women started to spread.93 Even though the last recorded lynching in 
Oklahoma occurred in 1930, the “rape myth” still held sway in the minds of many 
people. Blacks were seen at times as dangerous or threatening, and black parts of town 
were to be avoided lest some incident occur happen as you travel through. This concern 
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tinged many of the confrontations between blacks and whites in Oklahoma City even 
during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 Even during the 1950s and 1960s fear of black men sexually assaulting white 
women led to unfair treatment at the hands of the police. In August of 1954, an 
accusation of sexual assault interjected in to the relatively serene racial mood in 
Oklahoma City. A fifteen-year old white girl, unnamed on account of her age, alleged 
that she had been raped after a night on the town with a group of youths.94 The supposed 
rapist, a nineteen-year old black youth named Herbert Hill, who had been picked up by 
two girls who hoped that they could be shown the “Negro beer joints in Green Pastures,” 
which was one of the black areas of the city.95  
The group also picked up two white males while on the highway during the 
course of the night. After the group had gone to the taverns, the group parked the car and 
the other three members of the group fell asleep in the back seat while Hill and his 
accuser sat in the front of the car. She charged that it was during this period that Hill 
raped her. When questioned about the other occupants of the car, the girls refused to 
identify the two white males that came along on the journey. Eventually, the two girls 
capitulated and gave the names of the two after repeatedly being questioned by the 
police, and admitted who had accompanied them during the night. Several suspicious 
factors arose from this case concerning the accusations that were made by the alleged 
victim. Even though a crime supposedly occurred between the young black man and the 
white girl present, the two white youths fled the crime scene and it took the coercion of 
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the Oklahoma City police force to convince the girl to reveal the identities of the two 
white males. The other oddity in the situation when examined more closely was that, “We 
are asked to believe that this crime was committed within the narrow, contracted 
precincts of an automobile, on the front seat, without disturbing the Morphean occupants 
of the rear seat.”96 The possibility that these events occurred in the manner in which the 
young woman said that they happened aroused the suspicion of the police officers as wll 
as the newspaper in the area. After the full story emerged, the county attorney’s ffice 
declined to press charges against Hill because of the lack of evidence and the inability of 
the girls to corroborate their stories concerning the night’s events. An editorial in the 
Oklahoma City Black Dispatch elaborated on the problems that could erupt within a 
community after something as simple as young girl making up a story to try to escape 
punishment: 
  
The Scottsboro case exposed internationally the disposition of southern 
law enforcement agencies to exaggerate entirely out of its importance or 
justification sex relationship between white and black, and the facts revealed in 
this revolting case could be duplicated a thousand times all over the Southland. 
The myth of color has caused America to commit some horrible crimes, and the 
action in the Herbert Hill case shows some sort of morality and social decency 
seems to be attaching to unfortunate incidents we hitherto were just a little too 
marble-hearted about.97    
 
  
 While the police dismissed the charges against the accused in this case becaus  of 
a lack of a clear account of the event by the young woman, the law enforcement agencies 
admitting any sort of possible error represented the unusual much more than the norm. 
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Under the usual circumstances, the rumor alone may have generated enough innuendo 
and animosity surrounding Hill to at least guarantee a jail stay, if not a convicti  on a 
more serious charge. Instead the police questioned the story when a reason for doubt 
emerged during the investigation. Even if some doubt existed about the girl’s story the 
typical response in rape cases involved only thoroughly examining the case from a male’s 
perspective, and minimizing what the woman had to say. The fact that the young women
picked up a young black man to show them the beer joints and bars in the black part of 
town casted doubt upon the morality on the young lady immediately, whether such 
doubts were grounded in fact or fiction. Author and journalist Susan Brownmiller wrote
in discussing cases involving alleged black male on white female rape, “Not that the 
crime of rape did not take place-the petitions do not address themselves to that point-but 
that the poor reputations of a certain class of white women render their rape a less r 
crime even if their rapists are black.”98  Instead, the Black Dispatch reacted, 
understandably, in highly defensive manner. The newspaper’s editors understood the 
quickness with which a rumor or sexual misconduct by a black man could turn into jail 
time or worse if it spread.  
 Even though the police never filed formal charges during the course of the Hill 
rape proceedings, the case ignited a maelstrom of controversy in Oklahoma City. Angry 
blacks called for the girl to have charges pressed upon her and whites unnerved by the 
proceedings found the worst of their fears about blacks confirmed. Both sides found 
themselves considering their own attitudes towards racial matters as headlines offering 
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opinions about the rape case splashed across the pages of local papers. The result, a 
dismissal of charges against the young man, indicated the development of a sense of
tolerance, if not one of acceptance, towards black equality during the course of the debate 
in the weeks that surrounded the matter.  
Another view simply attributes the dismissal of charges as an example of police 
expediency resulting from the hope of avoiding controversy linked to the department. 
Beyond the shifting of personal attitudes towards African Americans, the case displayed 
the continued elevation of black legal rights within Oklahoma. Only twenty years
previous it would not have been unusual for a black man to be convicted or worse no 
matter whether a lack of evidence to determine his guilt existed or not. The polic’s 
acknowledgement that pursuing the case would fail to return a guilty verdict indicate  
that the false convictions based solely on race that were common in preceding decades 
had begun gradually fading away. Another possible reason behind the disproportionately 
inflamed reaction to the case came from the already heightened tensions between blacks 
and whites of all age groups. Historian Hannah Rosen described the phenomenon while 
she examined post-emancipation attitudes towards African Americans, but her statement 
could easily be adapted to the circumstances that followed the rape case in 1954. She 
wrote, “Many white southerners fervently resisted the entry into formerly white domains 
by African Americans, and one of the first ways they did so was by describing the new 
black presence as socially, sexually, and politically dangerous.”99 Even though the period 
examined in her work and this study are decades removed from the other, the struggles of 
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blacks remained frustratingly unchanged by the passage of time. Casting an omniscient 
eye over the country revealed economic repression, the forceful denial of political 
participation, and a black culture sequestered from mainstream American life, a situation 
that would look oddly similar to the blacks living through Reconstruction.  
Softening attitudes towards race issues and an increasing level of community 
involvement provided the support that allowed for civil rights activism to find a foothold 
in Oklahoma City. The bombshell of school desegregation mandated by the Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board drew the attentions of all Oklahoma citizens back to 
the race issue, as now their own children or grandchildren would regularly interact with 
black children. The increased interest in racial matters by all Oklahoma citizens produced 
a situation that set up perfectly for a more drastic approach to gaining equal rights than a 
push to stir up interest among the black community in Oklahoma. Government officials 
appeared confident that statements that used the right words would placate a populace 
that continued to become more vocally opposed to heady rhetoric that failed to address 
the significant problems affecting the African-American community.   
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FROM PLAN TO ACTION 
 
 
 Continuing issues surrounding political participation, the actual implementation 
of school desegregation, and the use of legal means to alter prejudicial policies c nt nued 
for the next several years, but the actions of a group of students and a well-respected 
school teacher forced the hand of business owners and state politicians to take some sort 
of stand on civil rights. Clara Luper, a teacher of American history at the all-black 
Dunjee High School, wrote and presented school plays on a yearly basis. In 1957, her 
play “Brother President” highlighted the non-violent methods of protest that Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. used in the civil rights demonstrations that he helped initiate. National 
Youth Director of the NAACP Herbert Wright attended the play while visiting Oklahoma 
City. Following the performance, he invited Luper along with the cast members to 
present the show in New York City for the “Salute to Young Freedom Fighters Rally.” 
The group of 25 youths and 6 adults traveled to the rally on donations collected at 
churches throughout the city, and while in New York experienced equality that they had 
never been exposed to in Oklahoma City. Restaurants owners treated the students as any 
other customers. The students could sit at tables in restaurants without controversy or stay 
in hotels that did not differentiate between races. This treatment left an indelible 
impression on the youths who made the trip. While returning, they decided that waiting 
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for court cases to be resolved may take years and this did not allow for the rapidity of 
change that blacks deserved. The group formulated a plan to attack segregation in the 
businesses of Oklahoma City.100  
The group, comprised of NAACP Youth Council Members, pushed forward in 
their attack of segregation when they returned home. Headed by Clara Luper, the group 
members studied the reasoning and methods behind non-violent protest and came up with 
a program that had four basic rules: (1) The objective at this time was to eliminate 
segregation in public accommodations. (2)To achieve this it required honesty on the part 
of those who participated- “non-violence is not an approach to be used by hypocrites-
honesty pays.” (3) You must love your enemy, “You are not to ridicule, humiliate, nor 
vilify him at any time or in any way.” (4) And finally, “Give the white man a way 
out…Find a way to let him participate in victory when it comes.”101 This group of rules 
reflected a clear plan for achieving desegregation and, more importantly, the thought 
processes behind their approach. The Youth Council’s intent clearly emerged from a 
nonviolent demand for equality. While this seems obvious, the distinction is important 
because it precluded the anger that conceivably could arise from either side of the 
desegregation issue, given the length and severity that mistreatment of African 
Americans in this country endured.  These teens outlined their methods because they 
knew that questions would follow the sit-ins. Luper condoned the actions, believing that 
the legal efforts of the NAACP parent body would not generate change and that 
demonstrations were needed.102 Luper later recalled the most significant reason behind 
the trouble with desegregating public facilities in Oklahoma, “That was the one problm 
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we had. You see, I believed that white Oklahoma had never seen us; they’d never thought 
about us.”103  
Following these standards, the students began sending groups of two or three 
students to owners of downtown businesses to discuss the integration of their 
establishments. When this failed they initiated a letter writing campaign that hoped to 
sway the proprietors through writing. This did not succeed either. The group then shift d
their focus to those people in charge, and arranged meetings with both the City Council 
and the City Manager. The officials stonewalled the group at this turn as well saying, 
“We are sorry, we do not have the power to interfere in private businesses. We don’t tell 
the businessmen who to serve and they don’t tell us how to run our city government.”104 
Finally, the Youth Council turned to a group that they hoped would appreciate the moral 
high ground from which they were approaching the problem-- the churches of Oklahoma 
City. Both black and white churches failed to reciprocate any interest in actively pursuing 
integration in downtown business. The white churches just ignored the letters of the 
Youth Council, while the black churches agreed to make announcements about the 
group’s activities and solicit donations for any costs the group incurred, but would not 
take any sort of direct action.105 
Frustrated, but not necessarily surprised at the lack of support, the Youth Council 
began to make plans for confronting the segregation of the local businesses head-on. The 
Council studied non-violent protest for eighteen months prior to the conclusion of the 
letter-writing campaign. Feeling that the letters were not making a difference, the group 
decided to stage a sit-in at one of the downtown restaurants. Inspired by Dr. Martin 
Luther King’s Montgomery Bus Boycott, the first sit-in in Oklahoma City began on 
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August 19th, 1958 at the Katz Drug Store located downtown on the southwest corner of 
Main and Robinson. While blacks could enter and purchase goods at the drug store, the 
store owners prevented African Americans from sitting down to eat. Katz only allowed 
blacks to get food on a walk-up basis, and then had to find somewhere other than the 
lunch counter to eat their meals.106 In an effort to combat this policy, about fifteen people, 
including at least eight youths ranging in age from six to seventeen, entered the store and 
tried to receive service. Barbara Posey, a fifteen year old member of the Youth Council, 
sat down and attempted to purchase thirteen cokes with a five dollar bill but was refused. 
The group stayed until the closing of the restaurant and promised to keep returning until 
the store agreed to desegregate. Keeping their word, the students returned the next day
with the same result.107  
The Youth Council chose their target well for the first of the downtown sit-in 
because the owner of the downtown Katz Drug Store did not withhold service because of 
racial matters. Instead the store manager, J.B. Masoner said, “I want to do what the rest 
of the downtown people do, and if they start serving them at booths and counters I will 
too…But, I can’t be the first one. It’s a matter of policy. I have given instructions to the 
counter personnel not to argue with them. They are instructed to be nice, just don’t serve 
them.”108 The owners of the Katz store caved rapidly to the demands of the Youth 
Council to desegregate their store. The entire Katz chain, with stores throughout 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri, opened to people of all races.109  
By the following week, the group sat-in at four other stores downtown in addition 
to Katz: Veazey’s Drug Store, S. H. Kress and Co., Green’s Variety Store, and John A. 
Brown.’s Restaurant. Having heard news of the sit-ins at the Katz Drug Store from the 
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previous days, these four stores had time to determine their own policy and develop a 
plan to implement their decision concerning desegregating their restaurants. While the 
company in charge of Katz quickly made their decision to integrate their stores, the next 
four stores responded in several different ways. The student’s targeted the S. H. Kress 
and Co. store and restaurant as the location for their second sit-in. Yet, when the students
and Clara Luper entered through the front door to try to sit down and eat a smiling store 
manager greeted them. The manager explained his willingness to take the group’s order, 
but the chairs and tables had all been removed in an effort to prevent the Youth Council 
from demonstrating at the restaurant. Rather than conceding to be actors in the ridiculous 
plan of the Kress store managers, Luper and the group simply moved on to the next 
restaurant in their effort to be served. A few members of the group accompanied by 
several police officers then traveled over to Veazey’s Drug Store where the managers had 
already decided to serve anyone who wanted to come inside. The police proved 
unnecessary, and the group ate without trouble before moving on to their next target for 
desegregation. Green’s Variety Store also conceded quickly and opened the store to 
people of any race who desired service.110   
Despite the problems at Kress, the beginning of the sit-in movement in downtown 
Oklahoma City ran fairly smoothly. Of the five initial stores that the group sat in at, the 
struggle at John A. Brown’s became the central battleground for the Youth Council 
during the early stages of the sit-ins. The resistance of the Brown’s to integration came as 
a surprise to members of the black community. Given their location and the variety of 
products sold at the store, Brown’s clientele consisted largely of African-American 
customers. The planners of sit-ins assumed that because of this fact the owners of 
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Brown’s had little choice but to open its door to all races, if simply for the reason that the 
money that they lost if they refused to serve African Americans would be too great to 
maintain the policy. However, upon the arrival of the demonstrators if became quite clear 
that the managers and employees of the store intended to dash any expectation of an easy 
and peaceful resolution to the issue.111  
After entering Brown’s, the staff made the Youth Council aware of how 
unwelcome they were in the restaurant. The demonstrators, according to leader Clara 
Luper, “were welcomed with hostile looks and gestures by both customers and 
employees of the store.”112 As the group sat, the obvious disapproval of the other people 
in the store did not dissipate. The thick tension in the air and the contentious crowd 
frightened some of the more youthful participants. In response, the sit-inners sa g hymns 
and spirituals to try to bolster their spirits in the face of the opposition they encountered. 
Even though the group trained for the possibility that they would collide with adversity, 
actually being confronted with angry adults tested their mettle. One demonstrat r, seven-
year old Lillye Harris, received perhaps the biggest shock when one of the customers sat 
on her while she waited to be served. While the police escorted that individual out of the 
store, Clara Luper and her fellow Youth Council members calmed the girl down before 
they exited.113  The Oklahoma City police displayed their determination to not become 
the scapegoats that other law enforcement offices became during the civil rights protests 
in other cities. The police encouraged their officers to not let their personal feelings about 
the desegregation efforts affect their judgment.114  
The sit-ins at Brown’s continued the following day, August 23rd, 1958, when the 
same group headed by Luper returned to the store. After entering the restaurant, the 
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manager of the restaurant, Frank Wade, unveiled his new plan to try to prevent serving
the group. Whenever any African Americans came into the restaurant they would be 
required to ask each white customer if their presence upset them in any way. If the whites 
assented that they were uncomfortable with the blacks sitting down then they would be 
forced to stand up while they ate. Luper and the Youth Council members refused to abide 
by these guidelines and left after promising once again to return.115  
The Youth Council group returned to Brown’s for seven consecutive days with 
the number of demonstrators growing after each trip. By the end of the week of sit-in 
protests, the participants filled the luncheonette area of Brown’s almost beyond capacity. 
As word spread of the sit-ins spread throughout downtown Oklahoma City the number of 
those interested in observing or heckling the protestors increased. Two separate isod s 
of harassment occurred in the week that followed the first protests. The first consisted of 
a man, quickly ejected from Brown’s by the police, that loudly derided the protests for 
the disruption they caused customers. The other involved four young white men who 
brought a large rebel flag into the store in an attempt to inciting a response from those 
participating in the sit-in by displaying the symbol of the confederacy. The police once 
again diffused the situation quickly by removing the youth that tried to arouse trouble.116 
Not all of the customers at Brown’s supported the refusal of service by the owners of the 
store. The Daily Oklahoman reported that older white man bought ten dishes of ice cream 
for the child participants and attempted to give them out. The group declined the man’s 
generosity because it might distract from their efforts, but thanked him profusely or his 
kindness.117 The culmination of the first week occurred on Wednesday, August 27th, 1958 
when around 135 people filed into the store and sat-in, effectively limiting the amount of 
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business that could happen around them. Following the demonstration, the group 
reconvened outside of the State Capitol where they sang the National Anthem ad 
“Oklahoma!”118  
Some African-Americans not associated with the Youth Council also took it upon 
themselves to try to desegregate restaurants on their own outside of the targeted 
downtown Oklahoma City area. Stories started to circulate back to the newspapers and 
the NAACP detailing individual excursions into segregated restaurants to challenge their 
policies. One couple received service at the Uptown Cafeteria owned by W.P. Bill 
Atkinson. The customers reported that, “They treated us like King and Queens.” Upon 
being asked about the decision behind the desegregation of his restaurant, Atkinson 
answered, “Why my cafeteria is opened to the public and always has been. I have 
instructed my manager to serve anyone who enters the doors.”119 Whether the restaurant 
had been previously open to blacks is unknown, but now African Americans felt 
confident enough to enter a random restaurant and attempt to eat there indicates that th  
sit-in movement already had begun to provoke change concerning racial policies in 
Oklahoma City.120   
Not all of the restaurants followed the same cordial path that the employees at 
Katz did. At S.H. Kress the owners had removed all of the chairs at the counter of the 
store, and announced the plan to serve only on a “stand up” basis from this point 
forward.121 The John A. Brown Company continued to hold out service against the 
intermittent sit-ins until 1963.122 The Brown Company did gradually begin to voluntarily 
segregate by starting to admit light-skinned blacks in 1959, but for those who opposed 
any segregation this just raised the problem that, “many light skinned blacks are 
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indistinguishable from dark skinned whites.” 123 The classification of blacks between 
light-skinned and dark-skinned may have represented a minimal amount of progress from 
the era when the government considered anyone with even one drop of African blood to 
be considered “Negro,” but blacks considered the distinction unnecessary and offensive 
as it clearly still upheld segregationist policies.124 
On September 2, 1958, Clara Luper suspended the sit-ins at the downtown 
restaurants under the auspices that school would soon resume and the children who 
participated had their studies to concentrate on. In truth, the recess intended to give the
business owners a chance to reconcile their policies to the demands of the NAACP Youth 
Council. It also allowed for Vivian Reno, the executive secretary of the Oklahoma City 
Council of Churches, to try to meet with the business owners and try to devise some sort 
of conclusion to the sit-ins. Reno’s meetings with the owners failed to provide a 
resolution to the problem, and the sit-ins, along with an attempted boycott of downtown 
stores that practiced segregation ensued.125  
The break in the sit-ins also allowed for a period when information disseminated 
throughout Oklahoma City. The layoff provided a platform for the members of the Youth 
Council to elaborate on the underlying reasoning behind their actions. Perhaps the most 
eloquent elucidation came from Clara Luper who during a speech to members of the 
Youth Council said, “Race prejudice degrades the dignity of the individual and is 
therefore an offense against the human spirit. We are duty bound to eradicate all forms of 
intolerance in American life.”126 This inspired writing imparted the reason behind the 
continued vitality of the Oklahoma City movement and those behind it.    
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Throughout the ongoing sit-ins, the members of the Youth Council reiterated their 
own motives behind sitting-in. This continued over the next several years as the sit-in 
movement continued in Oklahoma City. This also allowed for the new members of the 
Youth Council to elaborate on their own reasons for joining in the movement. Since the 
Youth Council consisted primarily of middle and high school students, there needed to be 
a constant flow of new leadership as reinforcements as leaders graduated or moved on to 
other endeavors. For all of the problems with continuity that could arise from such ahig  
turnover of individuals important in the movement, the same rapid replacement rate 
revitalized the group as different students took up the mantle of leadership witin the 
Youth Council. At the time of the sit-ins, Gwendolyn Fuller, the youthful leader of the 
first set of sit-ins spoke out about how the action supported her personal beliefs, “The 
John A. Brown Company through its practice of racial segregation and its no comment 
policy has insulted millions of whites who believe in democracy and who realize that old 
prejudice must be closed from out country if we are to survive.”127 Beyond explaining the 
motivating behind the sit-ins, the statement placed the onus for action back onto those 
whites that, to this point, failed to make exert much effort towards desegregation.  
The previous statement also highlighted one trope that ran through many civil 
rights tracts and speeches during the 1950s and 1960s, the idea that the inequality present 
throughout the country degraded or completely denied the democratic principles that the
United States was founded upon. The civil rights activists reiterated the point ad nauseam 
during the course of the sit-in movement in Oklahoma City. The Youth Council released 
a statement addressing what they believed solved the question of, “Oklahoma City, What 
Is the Answer?” The writer acknowledged that the goals of the group were significantly 
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larger than simply integrating businesses in downtown Oklahoma City. The release 
asserted, “In conclusion, we firmly believe that Oklahoma City should exemplify the 
principles of humane democracy irrespective of race which in our way of thinking is far 
more important to Oklahoma, the United States, and to the world than the question of a 
person desiring food when he is hungry and seeking it wherever the general public is 
invited.”128 When interviewed, specific members of the Youth Council reprised their 
insistence about this point. Gwendolyn Fuller chose to speak directly about the troubles 
encountered at Brown’s luncheonette attacking their policies, “I do not believe that the 
managers of John A. Brown’s and the other restaurant owners will continue to hold on to 
a long lost dream of white supremacy. Rather I believe and pray that they will join with 
the organizations and people who are working to make democracy and Christianity work 
in Oklahoma City.”129 Another member of the Youth Council offered a similar sentiment, 
“I sit-in because I am able in a non-violent way to remind America of her undemocratic 
behavior.130 The group understood that their actions likely would affect circumstances 
well beyond Oklahoma City, and embraced the opportunity presented in spite of any 
difficulties or notoriety that might arise.  
Beyond the stress on democratic principles that some people highlighted, another 
way that African-Americans attacked the segregation came from emphasizing flaws in 
reasoning inherent in attitudes about segregation. Some bombarded the notion that 
segregation was biblically ordained with scripture that refuted the verses that upposedly 
supported the basis for separation of the races. Individuals pointed to the difficulty of 
forcing an entire race to remain a subclass without resenting that position. Historian Jason 
Sokol pointed out the frequently paternalistic attitudes that people developed concerning 
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African Americans noting, “Too often…whites believed affection could take the plac  of 
fairness.”131 In Oklahoma City the sit-ins hoped to wrest this fairness from whoever 
prevented it through non-violent demonstrations, but the remarks of Clara Luper 
emphasized the need for a swift and peaceful resolution to the racial problems in 
Oklahoma City by echoing the biblical pronouncement made by Abraham Lincoln a 
century earlier that “a house divided against itself cannot stand” when she conveyed her 
belief that, “This town cannot remain half segregated and half integrated.”132  Whether or 
not she recognized the trouble that would later arise throughout the South with white 
resistance to black equality, Luper did observe, “that the dream of true democracy would 
become a reality because these young will never be contented with second class 
citizenship.”133  
Despite the successes of the Youth Council, some people from the black 
community disagreed with the methods that the group used when attempting to 
desegregate the downtown restaurants. The biggest rift arose between two different 
groups within the NAACP, the Youth Council and the regular adult membership. The 
Black Dispatch presented the problems between the two factions as the adult group 
displaying some sense of jealousy over the accomplishments of the younger members 
who were not yet old enough to become full members saying, “Because on the one hand 
persons in the adult group want credit for what they haven’t the guts to do, while on the 
other hand the Youth Council is down town stepping on the toes of some adult members’ 
friends.” Reverend James Lawson recalled that the national NAACP agreed with the 
sentiments of the local parent body in their admonition of the Youth Council sit-ins, “the 
NAACP opposed [sit-ins]. The parent body, the branch body, chastised the school teacher 
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who was responsible for it, chastised them, told them to desist.”134 In addition, the paper 
attributes the reaction of the NAACP to the gains made by the youth group as a sense of 
the moment passing them by, “For years, the NAACP was the ‘Moses’ wielding the big 
sword that slew the school segregation for Ada Lois Sipuel. It was the ‘Moses’ that 
beheaded the dragon called segregation in interstate travel. But now the ‘Moses’ gr up 
has gone to sip tea.” Curiously, the issues between the two groups developed even though 
each used different methods in affecting change. The parent NAACP group relied on 
attacking segregation statutes by challenging through litigation, whilethe youth 
employed nonviolent civil disobedience. Both fought for the same ends, despite relying
on different procedures to achieve their goals.135 
The role that the young people played in the sit-ins also generated commentary 
that condemned the adults in the African-American community for the lack of interest 
and action in the desegregation of the restaurants. One editorial attacked the older 
members of the community for allowing children for being placed in such a dangerous 
situation.  
 
In Oklahoma City, the youth have started a battle to open eating 
establishments throughout the city for all citizens. What have you done in 
this effort? Are you contented to sit by and say “I am for them”? Why let a 
child have to do the job of a man? We don’t have to be Uncle Toms, we 
don’t have to go around with our hands out and our heads bowed any 
more. The time is now for us all to get upon our feet and hold our heads 





The differences in opinion could also be attached to a generation gap between the 
two groups. With the exception of Clara Luper, the Youth Council obviously represented 
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a younger cohort than the regular NAACP group did. With that space between the two 
groups new expectations arose. While some older African Americans still heard stories 
from immediate relatives about the days of slavery during their childhood, for many in 
the younger generation that time seemed removed from their own lives even as they 
heard the stories of others and the events that affected them. Being younger also removed 
the youths from some of the fear that older blacks may have been concerned about. 
Violence originating in racism obviously still threatened blacks throughout the South. 
Yet, a lull existed between the lynchings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and the televised brutality of police dogs and water hoses being used against 
civil rights marchers in Selma and Birmingham, Alabama that flooded the nation’s 
collective psyche in the 1960s.  
Angry rhetoric within the black community in Oklahoma City also generated 
heated responses. Accusing an individual of acting like an ‘Uncle Tom’ evoked ardent 
feelings as the term, originating as a character in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, came to be used to describe an African-American individual who turned 
their back on the race by acting in a manner that affirmed the white belief in the
superiority of the white race. While the accusation of someone being an Uncle Tom 
intermittently occurred during the years preceding the sit-ins, the charge became even 
more common during the sit-ins. When different people disparaged those who opposed 
the Youth Council’s actions, calling someone an Uncle Tom amounted to a charge of 
cowardice and intended to shame the person it was directed towards. Even with the 
stigma associated with the name some groups endured the charges, or even embraced 
them. In 1954, a group of blacks attempted to reestablish the Democratic Central 
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Committee (DCC). The DCC called for a separate, black political organization that 
allowed blacks, “to have the freedom to serve in any executive capacity in our own 
organization, rather than look on as the other fellow serves the organization after 
integration.”137 For those blacks fighting for integration and African-American political 
power in local, state, and national government the DCC seemed to be a “step backwards” 
and also referred to the organization’s leaders as “Uncle Toms.”138  
Going forward several years to 1958, people who did not support the Youth 
Council’s sit-ins became targets of the epithet as those who supported the group incited 
those who did not exhorting, “We don’t have to be Uncle Toms, we don’t have to go 
around with our hands out and our heads bowed any more. The time is now for us all to 
get upon our feet and hold our heads high.”139 Others highlighted the sacrifices that might 
be required to achieve equality, including cutting loose those who accepted the 
government program of gradual change. Dr. A. L. Dowell alerted other blacks to the
difficulties they might endure for the cause, “Friendships will often be broken, traditions 
must fall, and the Uncle Toms and Aunt Thomasines must be exposed if the youth of 
today are to walk without fear in the paths of respectability and pride. Long suffering, the 
loss of jobs, all of these are part of the sacrifice which must be made, if need be, in this 
struggle for first-class citizenship.”140 The sentiment that blacks who adopted a wait-and-
see type of philosophy concerning civil rights had an inability to affect change even 
received a celebrity endorsement when former Major League Baseball player for the 
Brooklyn Dodgers, Jackie Robinson told the Youth Council during a speech,  “We aren’t 
going to improve race relations with the ‘Uncle Tom’ type of Negro.” 141 
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Besides the parent NAACP, other failed to offer support for the downtown sit-ins 
as well. The role that faith played in the sit-ins recurred frequently in the statements of 
the participants in the actions. To pass the time while waiting for service, the sit-inners 
often sang church hymns and sometimes studied schoolbooks or scripture to distract them 
from angry looks or remarks extended by white customers.  But in general, churches in 
Oklahoma City offered little or no support for the actions of the Youth Council. Instead, 
churches distanced themselves from the direct efforts of the sit-inners. On Septemb r 
22nd, 1958, after the first of the restaurant sit-ins, the Youth Council initiated what they 
called a pray-in at churches across Oklahoma City. The youth-initiated pray-in 
represented the first recorded instance of that type of protest. Twenty pairs of youths 
attempted to integrate twenty different white churches throughout the metropolitan area 
by attending services. At the vast majority of the churches the youths experienced little 
trouble, but three of the churches turned them away.142 One of the churches, Kelham 
Baptist Church, offered to educate the youths on how God did not support the mixing of 
races, and volunteered to show the visitors the scriptural basis for their beliefs.143  
The sentiments of the churches varied on the matter of civil rights. More than any 
other factor, the beliefs of the pastor and church leaders concerning desegregation 
probably determined the willingness of parishioners to aid blacks in their efforts in 
gaining equality. At other times, the opposite occurred, and ministers acceded to the 
opposition towards desegregation that the members of the their congregations 
maintained. Reconciling personal beliefs about racial matters with a congregation that 
disagreed with them often conflicted the ministers involved. One minister explained the 
difficult circumstances he faced, “I feel, as Christians, we have a basic responsibility. But 
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you know, I am in a box…They [the congregation] see my role as a minister not as a 
sociologist. I have got to back off. This thing could split my congregation-just tear i
apart.”144 The anonymous minister’s statement above brought to the fore several different 
antagonisms that had to be acknowledged and handled. First, the internal struggle of the 
minister of what he believed constituted the conscientious action versus what the 
congregation understood as correct. Contained within this problem is the issue over what 
is the proper action to undertake biblically, and does this disagree with the interpretation 
of the congregation. Finally, the minister addressed the larger concern of how any 
disagreement over a social issue could easily overlap into church matters. If this 
occurred, then the minister not only had the congregation and church’s well-being to 
worry about, but his own role within the church and by extension, his job. The break 
between congregation and minister could be seen throughout white churches throughout 
the South. Emanating from other states came reports of pastors being fired from their 
positions for supporting interaction and cooperation between blacks and whites. The 
situation in Oklahoma bore a close resemblance to the circumstances elsewhere which 
caused blacks to claim, “That, on the whole, the southern white clergy had not 
demonstrated courage or martyrdom.”145 
    The attitudes of Oklahoma City churchgoers concerning integration, like thos  of 
a larger percentage of the population, were not so clear-cut.  During the fervor 
surrounding the fight for racial equality, one member of a local white church sent 
minister Ted Monroe (who supported civil rights for blacks) a copy of the Thunderbolt, 
“a publication of a White Citizen’s Council that highlighted the rape of white women by 
blacks, Jewish conspiracies, and race mixing.”146 At the same time the Youth Council 
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reported that, “The whites are really working to help us win the fight. They have been the 
unsung heroes in the fight…They have invited us into their homes and churches. This 
isn’t Little Rock. The good white people didn’t wait and are not waiting. They are 
speaking up for liberty, justice, democracy, and Christianity.”147 While quite happy with 
the support that the Youth Council gained from white churchgoers, frustrations still 
abounded from the absence of approval and assistance from members of black 
congregations. During a series of reports called “A Study in Racial Climate of Oklahoma 
City,” the people running the study observed, “For the most part Negro pastors have been 
conspicuous by absence. Well over 100 pastors of Negro churches have been represented 
by a total of only five or six during several years of demonstrations. Lately, white 
ministers, doctors, and priests outnumber by far Negro ministers.”148 The division over 
black rights in Oklahoma City obviously did not depend solely upon the lines of race. 
Instead, like the situation throughout the South, feelings over black achievement of civil 
rights were muddled. Dr. Chester M. Pierce elaborated on this in a study of the local 
racial climate in 1961. He said, I must share my disappointment and distress that there 
seems to be in this city all too many who believe that they should negotiate with whites, 
but not be seen or heard in public to condone aspects of passive resistance. Yet nearly all 
approve the wisdom of passive resistance, which aims to correct social injustice by he 
weapons of humility, kindness, honesty, and non-violence.”149 A variety of different 
factors generated support or resistance towards desegregation in Oklahoma City and 
simply attributing this to racism provides a quick but ultimately unsatisfying solution that 
lacks the nuance and detail necessary to understand race relations in the city. 
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Beyond the NAACP and the city’s churches some of the residents unassociated 
with any of the aforementioned groups also disagreed with the actions taken by the Youth 
Council. During a meeting on the sit-ins local businessman L. E. Richardson announced 
under the banner of the Eastside Citizens Chamber of Commerce that despite the fact that
he, “was against discrimination, they were against the sit-ins and would do everything in 
their power to stop the demonstrations.”150 However, the Eastside Citizens Chamber of 
Commerce disavowed Richardson as a spokesman for the group, dismissed his 
comments, and asserted that the Chamber, “stood 100 per cent behind the demonstrations 
and any other peaceful action that would bring about first class citizenship for min rity 
groups.”151 Ultimately, the majority of people made their opinions known when over a 
thousand eastside citizens announced their intentions to participate in a series of non-
violent demonstrations that were scheduled for the upcoming weekend.  
The Black Dispatch recognized that the disagreement among different groups of 
blacks over the methods being used were symptomatic of a larger problem. An editorial 
in the paper chastised the African-American community because, “There are too many 
Negroes who take upon themselves to be the self-appointed leaders and proceed to take 
over the planning for the entire city, and many times attempt to plan things with elf sh 
interest.”152  The L. E. Richardson incident provides an example of this type of behavior. 
A person, without a stake in an organization, claimed a position of influence and power. 
While the motivations behind his claim are unknown, Richardson displayed an instance 
of the “lack of unity in Negroes’ approach toward major problems.”153 Other African-
American community leaders assessed the situation in even harsher terms. Dr. A. L. 
Dowell asked, “How long will Negroes continue accepting pseudo leadership from a few 
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Uncle Toms?”154 Repeated mentions of “Uncle Toms” and continuing friction between 
the leaders of different factions within the assorted civil rights groups in Oklahoma City 
hinted at the fractures and fissures within the black community that made protests 
possible. 
Beyond a “lack of unity” the African-American population of Oklahoma City 
experienced the reemergence of another problem, the lack of political participation. Tired 
of being taken advantage of by white politicians with political interests, black community 
leaders urged citizens to make an effort to, “learn to vote intelligently.”  According to 
local optometrist A.L. Dowell, this process included, “learning the background of 
candidates and who they associate with, rather then just listening to campaign 
promises.”155 The frequent complaints about a lack of voter knowledge about potential 
candidates received a possible solution with the development of the New Deal 
Improvement Club. Leaders of the Eastside community formed the club to educate voters 
about the views that each candidate had on central issues, and how this affected the black
community. The originators also hoped that by informing the public about the candidates, 
they could prevent the temporary system of patronage that many felt contributed to th  
anemic power of the black voting bloc in Oklahoma City. Politicians often hired black 
aides to “help deliver the Negro vote,” only to fire them once the election cycle 
concluded. The group wanted to extend these jobs from a part-time basis to full-time. 
They also hoped that by ending this system that blacks would start being elected 
themselves, rather than whites gaining the black vote then ignoring their constitue t  
once achieving office. Acknowledging that on occasion individuals put their own interest 
above that of the African-American community, the Club made a statement condemning 
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such actions, “If we are ever to enjoy the privileges of first-class citizenship we must 
accept its responsibilities. We must vote for the candidates who earnestly desire to serve 
all the people—not as we are told to vote by a few Negroes who have already sold our 
rights.”156  
The previous paragraphs indicate the leadership problems that plagued local civil 
rights movements throughout the country. Throughout the South the numerous 
associations that dealt with civil rights activities (NAACP, CORE, SCLC, SNCC, Urban 
League, and diverse local affiliations) struggled with differing levels of organization, 
bureaucracy, and the number of capable coordinators available. Even the primary leader 
of the sit-in movement in both Oklahoma City and Tulsa remembered her personal 
wavering and the subsequent hardening of her resolve during the beginning of the 
movement,  
We participated in sit-ins until 1964, and I didn’t realize the threatening 
calls that I would get, all the time at night. I didn’t realize that somedays I would 
wake up and shotgun shells would be on my porch. I didn’t realize the hatred that 
was embedded in this town, and I didn’t realize the attitude of some of the 
policemen, and the responsibility of the government, of the whole city 
government. I never shall forget the mayor of the city told me that what I needed 
to do was to teach my people how to eat, and I had to tell him that I knew how to 
eat and my people know how to eat the day we were born; otherwise we wouldn’t 
be here.157 
 
The profile of the sit-ins received a major attention boost when the inspiration for 
the demonstrations, Martin Luther King, Jr., addressed an Oklahoma City audience at the 
Calgary Baptist Church in July of 1960. Highlighting the potential historical significa ce 
of activists both in Oklahoma City and throughout the country, King claimed, “We who 
live in the twentieth century have the privilege of standing between two ages -- the dying 
old and the emerging new.”158 King encouraged the participants in the sit-ins, 
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emphasizing the continued perseverance of the group while humbly overlooking his own 
work with the SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) in the preceding y ars, 
“The new order is not yet with us. We must give to our nation an example of non-violent, 
dignified, effective action.”159  
As already displayed in other incidents, government officials often failed to 
follow their own pronouncements regarding civil rights. When four blacks tried to gain 
entry to county commissioner Ralph Adair’s restaurant at Northeast Twenty-Third Street 
to receive service, the manager refused them service. This refusal of servicepresented an 
abrupt about-face from Adair who glad-handed black voters during his election campaign 
that gained him his position. The four members of the Youth Council turned away; 
Barbara Posey, Richard Brown, Roger Kelly, and Lillie Walker, reported that Adair 
announced that he would not serve them in his places of business because he did not want 
to become known as a “Negro lover.” When the Black Dispatch brought to his attention 
that during the previous election cycle Adair had conversed and ate barbeque and hot 
dogs with blacks, he replied, “I will stand by my record as a public official, but my 
private business is another thing and it shall be run in order that I can make money. I 
cannot make money serving Negroes because I will lose my white customers. I do not
want to be branded as a Negro lover.”160 According to the Dispatch, this once again 
brought up two concerns that African-Americans constantly reiterated as primary issues 
that needed to be addressed according if blacks were going to achieve racial quality: The 
number of blacks voting had to be increased, and those that did vote should elect officials 
who genuinely had their best interest in mind. Some government officials disingenuously 
promised to fight for increased black rights only to ignore that cohort of their 
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constituency upon being elected. Only supporting merchants who allowed blacks to shop
at their store was the second necessity. Without economic repercussions, storeowners had 
little reason to change their policies at the risk of alienating or offending their white 
customers.161 
This statement raised an extremely significant question about the sit-ins: Doe  a 
private business owner have the right to refuse service to anyone that he or she desires?
The previous statement of the City Council that they had no right to interfere in private 
business came to a fore once again. The situation at Atkinson’s cafeteria displayed the 
need for the city or state government to legally outlaw segregation for the situation to be 
resolved. The Oklahoma City chapter of the NAACP recognized the possibility of this 
type of challenge in 1954, well before the Youth Council even considered the downtown 
sit-ins. The parent body of the NAACP understood the defenses that white storeowners 
would use because of previous experiences throughout the country and called a meeting 
to address how to go about changing these segregationist policies. The meeting honed in
on the main problem behind the issue, “The state of Oklahoma has no civil rights statutes 
and there is a cloud over the practice of private institutions practicing discrimination 
against Negroes in the absence of constitutional or satutory [sic] provisions for 
segregation.” The discussion continued to address the legal aspects that could develop in 
a situation like a sit-in. Questions about these things included: “What is private enterprise 
and who may participate?” and “If licenses are granted, admissions, fees, or charges are 
made to the general public, what right does management have to select or exclude 
patrons?” This displayed the foresight of the leaders in the civil rights movement, and the 
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tactics that would be used against participants in Oklahoma City and throughout the 
South. 162 
While the disagreements over methods and the people who protested continued, 
Brown’s still refused to allow blacks into their store. Almost a year had passed since the 
original sit-ins, but the Youth Council maintained their struggle against segregation. On 
June 19th, 1959, four youths once again tried to gain service. Upon entering the restaurant 
the manager told them that all of the tables were occupied, and they could not expect to 
be served, even though at least half the tables within eyesight of the four youths were 
open. Hoping to avoid any conflict, the youths decided to try to desegregate another store 
so they traveled to the Maywood Drug Store on Sixth and Walnut. Once again the 
manager in charge told the students that they would not be served. The manager then 
added, “We have no place for you colored people.”163 These incidents provided the 
framework upon which the civil rights movement in Oklahoma City was built upon. The 
early sit-ins by the Youth Council entrenched a systematic nonviolent approach for the
movement in Oklahoma, and this approach would remain in place during future 
demonstrations.  
The sit-in movement in Oklahoma City experienced success in the majority of 
their efforts to this point in 1959. Yet, the stakes became higher than just desegregatin  
restaurants as the attention of the black community began to notice efforts that some saw 
as a white reaction to the efforts towards civil rights made by the NAACP Youth Council. 
The largest sense of outrage ensued following the announcement that the Oklahoma City 
commissioner’s districts would be shifting. The previous system had included the almost 
the entirety of Oklahoma City African Americans in one district, while the new lines 
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drawn split the black area of the city into two pieces. This, in turn, split the black vote in 
two, and further diminished an already shaky grasp on any sort of political power. 
Needless to say, community leaders were not pleased by the development. The President 
of the Citizens’ Chamber of Commerce, A. D. Mathues, urged black citizens to fight the 
redistricting, “so they won’t have power on each end.”  For many, the fact that Ralph 
Adair, the County Commissioner, seemed to be involved caused conspiracy theories to 
start to fly since he was fighting integration at his cafeterias at the sam time.164 Calling 
the whole activity a “total disregard of voter’s rights” the leaders of the black community 
vowed to continue their fight to reinstitute the previous voting boundaries.165 
The battle against those stores that refused to end discrimination intensified when 
the Youth Council announced that they, along with their supporters, would boycott those 
businesses that were still holding out against integration. The demonstrators announced 
that they would boycott after the failure of “five days of silent picketing of downtown 
restaurants [including] Brown’s, Anna Maude’s, and the Skirvin, as well as O’Mealey’s, 
Greens, Classen Cafeteria, Adair’s and L’Charrito.”166 The council did offer downtown 
business owners one chance of respite before they began the boycott, and the Retailers
Association and the leaders of the black civic organizations parleyed over the proposed 
boycott. However, when the meeting failed to produce the desired results for the Yout 
Council they instituted a four-day long boycott of the downtown stores that would not 
desegregate.167 The boycott, which the president of the Oklahoma City NAACP Dr. E. C. 
Moon called 70 percent effective, did little to dissuade the hold-out store owners who 
said, “they could see no decrease in Negro trade as a result of the general boycott.”168 
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Following the boycott, the sit-ins resumed throughout Oklahoma City. As the sit-
ins began to branch out beyond the downtown area the reactions to them increased in 
severity. Arrests started to occur for disorderly conduct as business owners sought out 
effective ways to prevent the sit-ins from happening at their stores. Eight participan s, 
four black and four white, demonstrated at the Anne Maud Cafeteria and were taken into 
custody. Even though they ended up having to only pay fines of ten or twenty dollars 
apiece, stronger reactions on the part of the police and storeowners were becoming more 
prevalent. After the early sit-ins, the store owners that refused to desegregat  their 
businesses hardened in their opposition to the demonstrators. They also developed an 
understanding of the means that they could use to fight back against the civil rights 
protests. Rather than bowing to unfavorable public opinion, they proclaimed their status 
as a whites-only location. The storeowners also pressed charges on the protestors f 
disturbing the peace or trespassing at any opportunity.169  In a more drastic example, 
Louis McNeill, the manager of the Civic Center Grill, tried to intimidate six 
demonstrators by locking them inside his restaurant after refusing them service. Clara 
Luper, along with five youth including her daughter Marilyn Luper, were forced to stay 
inside the stuffy, un-air conditioned building for several hours before attorney E. Melvin 
Porter negotiated their release. While inside, McNeill acted like he was about to spill hot 
grease on the children and the waitress mopped over them.170  The increasingly agitated 
behavior of storeowners accomplished more than simply drawing attention to the sit-ins. 
In addition to added media coverage, the threat of violence or arrest actually led many 
Oklahomans who had previously been on the fence about the sit-ins to sympathize with 
them and eventually support their efforts.  
80 
 
As time passed, the movement’s momentum attenuated. While sit-ins continued at 
the Springlake and Wedgewood Amusement Parks and the restaurants that still were 
holding out, most storeowners saw that further resistance to the sit-ins as only a 
temporary stop to the flowing tide of integration.171 The quest of the African-Americans 
of Oklahoma City to answer the questions above continued even while the student sit-ins 
successfully desegregated dozens of different restaurants. While the movement lost the 
constant media attention that characterized the early protests, the black community 
continued their support of the actions. Members of the Youth Council moved away to 
college or into the work force, making it necessary for different leaders to emerg . With 
the accomplishment of desegregating restaurants and businesses, new goals emerged that 
required other methods than just sitting-in. As the complexity of protestor’s methods 
grew, so did the intricacy of the responses by those that opposed the Youth Council’s 
efforts. Oklahoma City civil rights organizations turned their focus on economic equality 
and a greater political influence through an increasingly active black community. Though 
blacks had been allowed to vote for decades in the city the actions of the protesters 
proved to many that political participation could be a viable tool for achieving their goals. 
Frequently, white politicians used underhanded tricks in an attempt to maintain as much 
power in the hands of whites as possible. Hiring blacks to their campaign teams and then 
dumping them soon after the election, and gerrymandering the voting districts of 
Oklahoma City were only two examples of this type of behavior.  However, the 
continued persistence and growing sagacity of black leaders to these ploys proved too 
great to maintain white dominance. Ultimately, the desegregation of public facilities 
became a reality largely because of Clara Luper and the Youth Council she led. However, 
81 
 
simply giving credit only to that group fails to account for the work of others, either 
affiliated with a civil rights group or not. They achieved their goals because of th ir 
absolute refusal to accept inequitable treatment simply because of their skin color.  
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The other major city in Oklahoma experiences its own unique struggle for 
African-American equality. First established by Creek Indians, Tulsa thrived following 
the discovery of a major oil reserve in the area.172 As blacks filtered into the southwest 
from the eastern half of the country, white Tulsans deemed anyone with African-
American blood as a subclass of citizen and subsequently forced blacks to remain 
sequestered in one area of the city. The black community of Tulsa thrived despite the best 
efforts of whites to prevent black successes. This success created an area eventu lly 
known as “Negro Wall Street” as black businessmen turned a deplorable situation into a 
rousing victory for blacks in the region. However, a misinterpreted exchange betw en a 
black man and a white woman set back years of work by black Tulsans to create self-
sustaining community within the larger city to Tulsa.173 
The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 affected black-white relations in the city more than 
any other factor in its history. The riot, which began after an alleged incident between a 
black man and white woman in an elevator, destroyed almost the entirety of the African 
American section of Tulsa known as Greenwood. The area previously had been one of 
the wealthiest African-American areas in any city in the United States. The violence of 
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the riot, in addition to the need for an almost complete reconstruction of the 
neighborhood, caused blacks who could afford the option to leave for another city. The 
ensuing decades reasserted the division between blacks and whites, so much so that in the 
years following the riot that one study on segregation by the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights described the situation in Tulsa as, “An invisible wall had seemingly been 
erected between blacks and whites that almost completely isolated one race from the 
other.”174  
Restrictive housing covenants prevented whites and blacks from intermingling on 
a regular basis. Virtually the whole of the black population lived in the area of North
Tulsa since the beginning of the twentieth century. Black-white daily interaction 
consisted of white employers directing black employees in their tasks, and, eve if a 
friendly rapport developed, social circumstances dictated that interactions between the 
races rarely extended beyond courtesy. Despite these short moments displaying instances 
of mutual respect, the reciprocity ended once the individuals arrived in a public setting. 
The employment situation for the African Americans of Tulsa reflected bleaker 
circumstances than those in Oklahoma City. The earning potential of blacks, limited in 
almost any city in the country, fell even lower in Tulsa. The poverty level indicated this 
generality. Of the 39,850 residents at or below the low-income level in Tulsa in a study 
published in 1976, 14,055 or 35.5 percent were African American.175  The oppressive 
situation offered blacks few favorable options once they ended their education. Stayig in 
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the city meant accepting a low-paying job often in a menial position. If educated and 
black, job opportunities in Tulsa left little option but underemployment.    
 The employment situation in Tulsa also contributed to the poverty of the city. Few 
available jobs encouraged those blacks that completed their education to emigrate from 
Oklahoma City to other cities more open to hiring African Americans. As a reult of this 
“brain drain,” the black community lacked the number of “professional” leaders like 
doctors, lawyers, and prominent businessmen that Oklahoma City had. The problem 
emanated primarily from discriminatory hiring among businesses. One individual 
reflected on the problem in 1959, “The few openings that occur in our industry will go to 
the inexperienced white man or woman instead of the qualified Negro.”176 Even in 
circumstances when blacks did get hired, the employment that they gained often left little 
opportunity for advancement. Instead, “a number of the grocers, meat markets, and 
clothing stores hire us in laboring positions but never in a white collar job.”177 While 
some employers would not hire an African American until something or someone forced 
them to do so, others simply absorbed racial prejudices exposed to them throughout their 
lifetime. Winthrop Rockefeller, a board member of the National Urban League, delivered 
a speech to the local chapter imploring the attendees that, “Blacks must prove to whites 
that the characteristic of mediocrity is not inherent in blacks.”178 The message addressed 
the need of African Americans to disprove the damaging rumors surrounding the race, 
even if it meant adhering to a higher standard of behavior than that expected of whites in 
the same or higher positions. Rockefeller continued, “In recognizing this fact-fact and not 
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aspiration-we must realize that first class citizenship will require work and understanding 
and not miracles.”179 The work it would require to convince whites of black equality 
often discouraged blacks from applying themselves in what they saw as a futile endeavor.  
The dearth of good jobs for blacks caused numerous other problems within the 
Greenwood community. The housing market in the areas of town where blacks were 
permitted to purchase homes was virtually nonexistent. As a result, the only housing 
options open to blacks consisted of undersized homes. Usually they were in poor 
condition, resulting from the general overcrowding of the homes by their previous 
owners. Realtors also frequently inflated the costs of houses    Few available jobs and 
massive unemployment in Tulsa often forced multiple families to live together in omes 
intended to shelter only a single small family. With close contact unavoidable with such 
poor standards, health problems sprouted throughout the Greenwood area. After a six-
week long study of the neighborhood city and county health director Dr. Paul Haney 
reported that, “”Living conditions in the Greenwood area make it a hotspot for many 
diseases in Tulsa.”180  
 Several different organizations headed efforts to improve conditions for African 
Americans in the community. The Prince Hall Masons, an African-American fraternal 
organization, encouraged the enrichment of the community through social participation 
and service. Another group, the Greenwood Chamber of Commerce, formed to advance 
the welfare of the businesses that resided in North Tulsa. Each group willingly 
volunteered time and money to whatever endeavors that seemed to promote the 
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movement toward African-American equality in the United States. They welcomd 
another civic group to Tulsa when they helped bring a chapter of the National Urban 
League to the city. Both the Prince Hall Masons and the Greenwood Chamber of 
Commerce offered two thousand dollars in seed money to establish the chapter in Tulsa. 
The Urban League focused on educating citizens on employment issues believing that 
increasing the number of skilled and gainfully employed individuals also improved the 
economic position of blacks throughout the country. By achieving economic 
empowerment, blacks could use their newfound wealth as a source of influence that could 
help to advance the causes of African Americans nationwide.181  Its methods included 
“conferences, understanding, and mutual agreement,” and it aimed to, “improve the 
social, economic, and working opportunities for minority citizens.”182 Tulsa also counted 
a NAACP chapter among its organizations. The NAACP promoted African-American 
welfare by challenging segregationist and discriminatory policies throug  legislation and 
judicial decision. Yet, like their Oklahoma City brethren, getting citizens to participate 
became an enduring quandary for the Tulsa chapter. Even with constantly trumpeting the 
need for voters to pursue participatory democracy with their ballots, the actualturnouts at 
voting tills continued to disappoint.183  
 The white leaders of Tulsa often demonstrated contradictory attitudes about civil 
rights in their city. Even though blacks implored important whites for egalitarian 
legislation to be passed, “He has appealed to the City Hall- He has bargained with 
politicians,” they gained little public support. Since politicians relied on their 
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constituents, they were forced to pay attention to the people who voted for them, whether 
this agreed with their personal feelings about the civil rights movement or not. Some 
politicians opposed the movement towards black equality and refrained from saying o in 
a public forum. A story related by Pastor Karl Lutze, an active participant in thecivil 
rights movement, illustrated the conflict that often occurred with whites regardin  
African-American rights. While serving as the chairman on the Tulsa Industrial Relations 
Committee, one of the other board members could no longer contain his umbrage and 
explained, “that he had been willing to serve because he wanted to lend his efforts to 
bring decent housing to minorities, but he was disturbed to learn that the Urban League
had also been pressing to eliminate separate seating at symphony concerts downtown.” 
The reasoning behind the outburst? He did not want his wife to have to sit that closely 
with blacks when they attended the musical.184 Even those whites that displayed interest 
in black civil rights often dealt with internal conflictions about exactly how much ground 
that blacks should gain. The inability of blacks to solidify a significant voting bloc left 
these unsure whites with little incentive to completely embrace black equality. 
 The lack of black citizens voting in both local and state elections exhibited 
perhaps the most indicative sign of the lack of effort in improving conditions. Not all 
black Tulsans contributed to this problem. Efforts to remedy the dearth of election 
participants came from several different sectors of society. The Tulsa Ministerial 
Alliance, a group comprised of the African-American churches in the city, began a voter 
registration drive at Booker T. Washington High School in 1958. The Tulsa-based 
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Oklahoma Eagle also contributed to the endeavor by publishing editorials pleading for 
increased participation in the upcoming city elections. One commentary in the newspaper 
encouraged registration when it asserted the obligation that North Tulsa residents ha to 
vote, “A people are a free people only so long as they are factors in determining what 
shall be the character of the government under which they live and likewise the character 
of the personalities who have the responsibility of governing.”185     
 Repeated adjurations by Tulsa civic groups, as well as local newspapers, did little 
to improve voter participation despite voter registration drives during each election cycle. 
When serious efforts failed, the Eagle turned to more humorous efforts to make its point. 
During the Christmas season they recruited the help of Santa to outline the failings of 
black community, and on Christmas Eve of 1959 he chided Tulsa residents for a lack of 
political participation. Santa withheld the traditional Christmas gifts explaining, “Well, 
well, well, What’s wrong with those apathetic charity seekers. I intended to give them 
better jobs, facilities, homes, and less juvenile delinquency but I can’t help anyone who 
won’t help themselves.”186 Two organizations, the Urban League and the staff of the 
Tulsa Eagle, recognized that the methods being used in the voter registrations drive 
needed to change if the number of voters was going to increase. Instead of sending out 
mass mailers to the whole of the North Tulsa area and going door-to-door to try to drum 
up support, the new method relied upon already established personal relationships. The 
groups divided up the area into separate divisions, and assigned each division a “personal 
evangelist” to register voters. These “personal evangelists” were much younger than the 
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previous volunteers sent out to register voters. The Urban League and Eagle placed their 
hope in the fact this new cohort of volunteers, “is young enough to be vigorous in the 
prosecution of his task,” “old enough and enlightened enough to know the value of the 
effort,” and “free enough from the political red tape and money politics to win the 
confidence of this oft-betrayed constituency.”187  
The desegregation of Tulsa schools failed to progress with any more speed than 
the schools in Oklahoma City. Like their counterparts to the south, the Tulsa school 
district demonstrated an unwillingness to move expediently to integrate their sc ools. The 
opposition by Tulsans to the dictates of the Supreme Court reached such a high level of 
resistance that legal means had to be used to force schools in Oklahoma to admit blacks 
on a normal basis. Instead of an esteemed private citizen and community leader who sued 
the Oklahoma City schools, on July 30th, 1968 the United States Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark accused the school district of failing to comply with the Brown ruling 
made four years prior by still maintaining what basically amounted to segregated 
schools.188  
Possibly the most significant difference between the civil rights movements in 
Oklahoma City and Tulsa came from the level of participation of churches and ministers 
in the two communities. While Oklahoma City churches provided some help for civil 
rights activism, it primarily came in the form of donations or allowing groups of activists 
to use church facilities to meet and strategize about upcoming demonstrations. Ministers 
were unwilling to take a stand on the non-violent protestors, instead they repeated 
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concerns about how taking a personal stand could affect the congregation and their place 
as minister within the church, and decided to primarily leave what they saw as politicking 
out of the pulpit. The ministers in Tulsa viewed their responsibility in the civil rights 
movement in a decidedly different manner. While ministers in Oklahoma City avoided 
the possible controversy caused by addressing the potentially divisive issue, the cl rgy of 
Tulsa supported the movement from its inception.  Several of Tulsa’s African-American 
ministers began to create plans of action designed to address the severely prejudicial 
treatment of blacks within the city in the 1950s. The group, which drew its inspiration 
from the non-violent methods of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., included among its number: 
Reverends B.S. Roberts, Ben Hill, G. Calvin McCutchen, and T. Oscar Chappele.189 
During the ongoing restaurant sit-ins in Oklahoma City, the adult sponsor of the 
movement, Clara Luper, spoke at the Vernon African Methodist Episcopal (AME) 
Church in Tulsa. She challenged the listeners to replicate the successes of the Youth 
Council had in Oklahoma City. One of the primary concerns addressed by Luper was 
once again leadership among blacks. She asked, “Who is concerning themselves about 
our young, to lead them into the serious ventures of social action that works for a better 
community?”190 The editors of the Tulsa Eagle were struck by this question and applied 
the question to themselves, and their city about Luper’s remarks, “We could not refrain 
from making the contrast-We could not forgo asking the question-‘who cares in 
Tulsa?’”191 Unfortunately, while women and men who supported civil rights for blacks 
abounded in Tulsa, efforts to achieve change were fractured, much as it had been in 
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Oklahoma City before the sit-ins headed by Luper’s group. In both cities the movement 
needed something to unify the various people and organizations fighting for the same 
goal but using different means to achieve it.  
Even though the organization first printed the statement a year before Luper’s 
address, the statement of the Tulsa NAACP about the Oklahoma City sit-ins answered the 
questions the newspaper posed, “The Tulsa Branch NAACP does not contemplate any 
similar move at the present time, but the local branch will continue to be vigilant in its 
efforts to secure equal treatment of all American citizens.”192  The plans of the NAACP 
did not satiate Tulsans who desired some form of action to be undertaken to remedy the 
injustices in Tulsa. One person who supported an active response towards discrimination 
wrote to the editor of the Eagle:  
“I read in the papers (yours included) that a very successful picket line has 
been formed in Kansas City and has been successful. The stores being picketed 
are stores practicing discrimination against citizens of color; stores will not allow 
colored personnel and do not appreciate the business the Negro citizens give 
them. The NAACP in Tulsa could very well be instrumental in doing this type of 
thing here because a number of the downtown stores that cater to Negro buying 
still practice discrimination. If we would picket these stores, or better still cease to 
buy their merchandise, our strength (dollars) would be felt. And a loss of several 
thousand dollars a month in revenue will be felt by any business.” The sit-ins 
provided this rallying point used to unite the black community in Oklahoma City, 
but by 1959 no event or person displayed the dynamism necessary to galvanize 
Tulsans to do the same.”193  
  
The leaders of the movement towards equality in Tulsa recognized that changes 
needed to be made if they hoped to be successful. Observing the situation in Oklahoma 
City, they decided that emulating Luper might improve results for Tulsans. Citizens 
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called for more effort in the push for equality.  A few pinpointed the same problem that 
the Youth Council in Oklahoma City dealt with before and during the sit-ins, the 
resistance to the methods being used. One Tulsa citizen attributed the ineffectiveness to 
the age of those in charge, “Some of these old die-hard leaders who have long outlived 
their usefulness should step aside and let the younger set take over and push for some of 
the good things out of life that are promised all citizens.”194 The introduction of new 
blood into the movement energized the movement, and brought fresh perspectives to the 
strategies being used by civil rights organizations. However, the call for replicating the 
actions of the Oklahoma City largely went unheeded.  Instead, civil rights organizations 
relied upon the same methods for improvement of circumstances for the black 
community. The problem displayed in Oklahoma City displayed itself in Tulsa, but in a 
different form. In Oklahoma City problems arose primarily between the ational, local, 
and city Youth Council of the NAACP, but in Tulsa the civil rights organizations 
cooperated in their efforts quite well. Throughout the 1950s, the mass of African 
Americans in Tulsa remained indifferent to these organizations and to politics, inhibiting 
progress in civil rights. Despite constant encouragement to participate by community and 
political leaders, unaffiliated blacks aggravated even the most affable volunteers with 
their lack of involvement.  
 The ineffectiveness of civic groups devoted to civil rights also needed to be 
overcome before any significant changes emerged. Two organizations in particular came 
under fire for the ineffectualness of their activities. The first, the Greenwood Chamber of 
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Commerce, influenced policies in the black community beginning in the early 1950s, and 
received plaudits for its role in bringing together area businesses into one body that could 
influence local policies. By the early 1960s, citizens attacked the Chamber of Commerce 
for not doing enough. Even though the group “has talked of ways and means of 
improving Negro business, but the fact that Negro business has not only failed to 
improve, but has diminished consistently, sticks out like a sore thumb.”195  The other 
organization that the public scrutinized in Tulsa was the NAACP. While the Greenwood 
Chamber of Commerce dealt primarily with the businesses, the NAACP devoted its 
energy solely to the cause of civil rights. As a result, its inactivity magnified. The issue 
evoked an intensified level of criticism from those who expected the organizatio , on 
account of its national connections and seemingly greater resources, to be able to 
generate greater change than any of the others in the city. The rhetorical questions asked 
of the Tulsa NAACP branch chastised the organization for its inadequacy in generating 
change in Tulsa, “What action has our local branch taken to cure the ugly features of 
inequality in Tulsa? What single demonstration? What single lawsuit has grown out of 
our togetherness here as a local chapter, a single link in this mighty movement across the 
nation?196  
 The vehement outrage voiced by members of the NAACP in Tulsa only partially 
detailed the list of grievances held by the city’s black citizens against city leaders, 
employers, and other blacks who displayed little passion for the fight for equal rights that 
consumed many African Americans. One editorialist voiced his disgust saying,  
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Eighty percent of the industries in Tulsa maintain a policy of 
discrimination that makes no provision for employment of people of color. 
We’ve been undergoing a run-around in the City Hall and the County 
Court House so long we’re almost dizzy from the chase, and the reason 
they offer for not hiring a Negro is that there are no vacancies for us…We 
can’t borrow money like other people from the banks only banks we have 
because we have to bank what little money we got; We can’t buy property 
in certain areas because we haven’t achieved what it takes to be accepted 
by the exclusive. All this and more items that could be named keep us in 
the valley of depression, blots out any opportunity to build healthy 
aspiration and in the main leaves us without hope, either for ourselves or 
for our children…Maybe we’re not satisfied, just resigned to the fate of 
living our lives among the living dead. And maybe, to the dead it is too 
much to hope that these dead will be quickened by proposing that the 
multiplied use of the ballot; that the pooling of 12 or 15,000 peoples ‘one’ 
vote could change this.197 
  
The continued accumulation of injustices suffered by black Tulsans combined with the 
successful efforts of the Oklahoma City NAACP Youth Council reignited hope among 
the community that Tulsa’s activists could duplicate the achievements of their neighbors 
to the south.  
By 1960, African Americans made efforts to reach out to the managers of 
businesses that count among their customers a sizable number of blacks. However, after 
discussions with the owners of the Froug’s, Brown Dunkin, and Field’s stores nothing 
changed. The discussion ended with the stores explaining the tough situation they were 
in. They worried about what would happen to their individual business if they voluntarily 
desegregated before the stores that sold similar products in the same area. Concerned 
about giving away business with no guaranteed reciprocal benefits, the trio of store 
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managers “agreed in principle that racial discrimination should be eliminated.” This 
statement came with the provision from the three, “that they as individual companies will 
not openly advocate fair employment practices unless their competitors will agree to do 
the same.”198  Other downtown stores implemented similar policies. One business owner 
offered his opinion on the matter, “We will try to continue to do business on the basis of 
what the majority of our customers prefer whether it relates to employment, promotions, 
sales, etc.” Mirroring the statement of the other store managers, he continued, “As far as 
integrating our working force at all levels, we know it will happen but we have no 
immediate plans and intentions of pioneering in this area.”199 The next logical step for 
those pursuing civil rights would be to find additional stores willing to pledge support for 
integration in businesses.  
 Not all businesses opposed integration in Tulsa, and the Oklahoma Eagle made a 
habit of recognizing those that served or employed African Americans. Among those 
stores listed as being friendly to the black community included, “Crown Drug 
Store…Banfield’s Meat  Market, Timmerman’s Meat Market, King’s Groce y, the Ben 
Franklin Store, and several others.”200 Even though some businesses supported the cause, 
the vast majority still enthusiastically retained their right to refuse service to anyone that 
they deemed not in their best interest to serve. The Eagle also used the opposite method 
in an attempt to shame uncooperative businesses into integrating their establishments. In 
addition, by publishing the “names of business who do not cater to Negroes,” the paper 
made sure that no one could be confused by not admitting blacks to their stores as, 
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“pictures will be taken of anyone who continues to patronize places that refuse to hire 
Negroes.”201 While voter registration drives and discussions with business owners 
continued, this action represented a shift in the type of methods used to fight for equality 
and adumbrated the more active types of resistance that lay ahead. 
 The civil rights movement in Tulsa received some much needed encouragement 
when the unofficial national leader of the movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
traveled to Tulsa to deliver an address at the First Baptist Church in the summer of 1960. 
Met at the airport by over one hundred supporters, the group escorted King in a parade of 
cars through the streets to the church.202  Introduced by the Reverend Ben H. Hill as “the 
living Moses,” the primary theme of King’s speech called for unity among all people 
fighting for the cause of civil rights saying, “God loves all His children. All men are 
made in his image and we must work together until freedom is obtained for all.” He also 
stressed the dire need for civil rights to succeed for the sake of the county first 
explaining, “If democracy is to live, segregation must die.” After emphasizing the 
successes had by the movements throughout the country, King offered his most searing 
message, “We must learn to live together as brothers or die as fools.”203 He then offered 
one piece of advice essential to the sit-in movement, “The white man must have love in 
the coming new world. Until then, we will meet his physical force with our soul force; his 
tendency to inflict with our tendency to endure, and his hate with our love. And one day, 
our capacity to suffer will overcome him.”204 Having been thoroughly inspired by King 
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the audience returned home eager to demonstrate that his message had been taken to 
heart. 
The increased aggressiveness of the Tulsa civil rights movement saw its first new 
type of activity in 1963, when a group called the “Citizens for Progress” introduced a 
petition that aimed to desegregate any business that could be called a “public” facility.
Attempting to gain the support of the mayor of Tulsa, the group planned to circulate the 
petition and gain a large number of signatures, thinking that this would spur the mayor 
into proceeding with some sort of ban on segregation. Headed by the Reverend Ben H. 
Hill, who also served as president of the North Tulsa Ministerial Alliance and the Tulsa 
chapter of the NAACP, the petition reversed the course of previously lackadaisical efforts 
of the organizations. However, it did not persuade any city officials to take any 
immediate action. Instead they tabled the idea for further discussion, which allowed them 
push back any possible issues until some undetermined future date.205  
While community groups made little progress towards the eventual integration of 
all public businesses in Tulsa, churches dealt with the still unanswered question of how 
much they would contribute to the more aggressive civil rights tactics undertaken by 
civic organizations. The first major step towards churches supporting the civil rights
movement occurred when the Oklahoma Council of Churches met and composed a 
document that supported ending discrimination in churches statewide. The manifesto 
launched a unified affirmation of civil rights that said, “We call upon local churches and 
congregations to make clear to the community at large that the churches and 
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congregations are open for worship to all persons irrespective of race, religion, or 
national origin.”206  This statement mirrored the declaration made in February the prior 
year by the Tulsa Council of Churches that opened that city’s churches to, “all men who 
seek to flee the wrath-that is to come and get the salvation offered through the gospel, are 
welcome.”207  The black residents of Tulsa warmly received the news. However, even the 
118 churches in Tulsa that signed the statement represented 60 percent of the churches
that had membership in the council. While the church’s action provided a positive step in 
race relations within the church, many churches still refrained from welcoming blacks 
into their services.208  
The progress being made in the civil rights movement did not please all Tulsans. 
At a bi-racial meeting of the City Commission organized with the intent of hearing the 
public opinion on the public accommodations ordinance discussed tempers flashed during 
the proceedings. . The meeting started off calmly enough, and a relatively cordial
atmosphere endured for much of the assembly. During the meeting Ted Cotton, the 
former leader of the White Citizens Council of Tulsa and the current leader of a gr up 
called the United Conservatives, attacked two of the civic organizations that had arranged 
the forum and were heavily invested in the civil rights cause, the Urban League and the 
NAACP. He stated that, “The NAACP is not and never has been for the Negro people.” 
His claims grew more and more outrageous. He even tried to explain that, “[it was a] 
myth that white men are exploiting the Negro. It is the Negro leaders who are exploiting 
the masses.”209  While this example exhibited the radical opposition in Tulsa to African-
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American equal rights, common people also displayed a reluctance towards black 
progress. When the Tulsa Planning Commission confirmed zoning plans for the first new 
apartment building for blacks since 1921 the complex failed to pass the board as a result 
of petition filed by 120 housewives. They claimed that bringing a large number of blacks 
in the area would funnel too many children into the nearby elementary school and it also 
would result in decreased property values. While not as virulent in its language, the 
actions of the housewives displayed quite clearly the opposition that many whites 
throughout Tulsa still maintained.210  
Driven by two organizations headed by Tulsa young people, the Student 
Committee on Human Rights and the Youth Council of the NAACP, demonstrations 
began in March of 1964 with a Freedom March Parade. The march planned to draw 
attention to a five-fold program of issues including; “voter registration, Federal Civil 
Rights legislation now pending in Washington DC, Strong city ordinances on public 
accommodations, and better job opportunities.”211 Moving on a pre-planned route from 
the Vernon African Methodist Episcopal Church to Boulder Park, about 400 marchers 
carried signs displaying civil rights mottos like, “Jim Crow Must Go,” “We Shall 
Overcome,” and “Freedom Now.”212   The march went off without difficulty; many of the 
demonstrators continued their efforts fighting injustice.  
After the Freedom March, a sit-in organized by the Congress of Racial Equality 
occurred at the Apache Circle Restaurant. Fifty-four members led by president Milton T. 
Goodwin entered the business, seated themselves, and asked for service. The owner of 
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the restaurant, who was dining when the protestors entered, told them to leave and then 
called the police when the continued to occupy the store. He then charged the whole 
group with trespassing. The CORE members maintained their sitting positions up  the 
arrival of the police, forcing the officers to carry them out of the restaurant and into a 
waiting transport to the jail. Having planned the demonstration ahead of time, the group’s 
lawyers arrived quickly and negotiated their release.213 
Shortly after the Apache Circle sit-in, Clara Luper, along with white University to 
Tulsa student Dan Dryz, led a group of approximately eighty youths to Borden’s 
Cafeteria to attempt to gain service. About twenty marchers entered the restaurant and 
tried to pick up food from the cafeteria line only to be turned away, and all the food 
removed from the line. After being refused service, the group declined to move out of the 
store and the remainder of the protestors surrounded the front and back doors of the 
restaurant. The manager called the police who dispersed the crowd, but not until nineteen 
demonstrators were arrested for trespassing and taken to jail along with twen y other 
juveniles who were not arrested.214  
The sit-ins continued for the next several months at various restaurants throughout 
Tulsa with some success. Many restaurants conceded to integration after being contacted 
by the civil rights organizations in the hope that they could avoid having a sit-in protest 
happen in their store. Others held out and refused to integrate and, as a result, 
demonstrators picketed outside of their business. This forced customers to cross the 
picket line to receive service at the store, and kept many people from shopping at stores 
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that insisted on segregation. Much like the situation in Oklahoma City, the drastic 
changes in the civil rights movement in Tulsa occurred when the youth organizations 
finally became involved in the movements. Both the CORE chapter in Tulsa and the 
NAACP Youth Council had been established within the previous two years, yet still 
managed to force the Tulsa City Commission to pass an accommodations ordinance with 
three months of the beginning of their sit-ins.215 All of the calls for increased dedication 
and action from black adults, quickly were quelled once the youths and young adults took 
the initiative and adopted the leadership of the movement themselves.  
The rapidity with which the city government passed legislation that allowed for 
blacks to enjoy equal rights in Tulsa demonstrated a clear difference between the political 
leaders in Tulsa and those in Oklahoma City. Within a few months of the beginning of 
the demonstrations by the NAACP Youth Council, CORE, and other unaffiliated 
activists, the Tulsa city government passed a public accommodations ordinance that 
assured that restaurants and other facilities open to the public could not ban patrons upon 
race only. While many store owners and managers desegregated their businesses prior to 
1964, the state legislature forced those who still retained segregationist policies to 
integrate their stores. Despite years of attempts by sit-ins, parades, nd appeals to city 
politicians the city reacted with a mix of indifference to the plight of African Americans 
and unwillingness to alienate themselves from their constituents. The movement cam at 
a later date to Tulsa, but the quick response of officials demonstrated a strong sense of 
empathy and responsibility to their black citizenry that Oklahoma City leaders 
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continually deemed unnecessary. Perhaps because of the riot years earlier th  government 
leaders in Tulsa responded much more quickly to the demands of their black citizens after 
sit-ins began. City officials avoided the protracted desegregation struggle by 
acknowledging the grievances of Tulsa’s African-American community. Despite 
Oklahoma City’s hope to be seen as a “progressive” city, the quick action of their 
northern neighbor after the demonstrations displayed a much more enlightened attitude
towards racial matters.  
 Louisville, Kentucky shared similarities to the conditions in both Oklahoma City 
and Tulsa. Called “the most ‘Southern’ of the border states,” Louisville retained the same 
attitudes toward race that Oklahoma did.216 Even after emancipation those blacks that 
lived or moved into Kentucky remained second-class citizens both socially and 
economically. The early economies of both the cities in Oklahoma and Louisville 
operated primarily around a single economic source. In Oklahoma City oil reigned, while 
Louisville remained an industrial center that relied upon it central location along the Ohio 
River to serve as a mid-point between the east coast and southwest markets for shipping
and receiving goods. This concentrated the wealth of each city in the hands of a few, 
white businessmen. Since the economy was based around a single source in each city, 
black workers were often forced to work at whatever leftover jobs were available. The 
characteristics of each city’s economy made it increasingly difficult for a black person to 
break out of crippling poverty or to increase their social standing.  
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The first two decades of the twentieth-century proved to be a positive period for 
the blacks of Louisville. Several railroad companies had hubs located in Louisville, and 
the tracks offered careers for black men better than the typical agricultural occupations 
available to them. Consequently, a great many of blacks found themselves in the employ 
of the railroads. Like in others places of employment, blacks still found themselves in the 
hardest, hottest, and dirtiest positions in either the rail yards or on the locomotives but the 
job “remained desirable work for blacks, as it usually meant competitively high wages 
and job security.”217  The rail lines also offered a reason for businesses to relocate to 
Louisville, as the ease of shipping by train could be an attractive commodity for those 
looking to minimize costs. Even though railroad companies established black 
employment in the late nineteenth-century in Louisville, the growing labor move ent 
and the early years of the Great Depression combined to force African Americans out of 
positions they occupied for nearly forty years. When whites in other jobs found 
themselves out of work, they became willing to take any position available including 
those that they believed were beneath them only a few months earlier.218  
The flood pushed bleak situations of Louisville’s African Americans into 
dramatically worse conditions. In 1937 a flood swept through the city destroying blocks 
of the city most of which was located in the floodplain of the Ohio River. Unsurprisingly, 
the vast majority of the homes left under water belonged to blacks as whites ensured that 
their homes were located out of the reach of the rising waters. Following the devastation 
left by the raging torrents, the black community needed to be rebuilt from the ground up. 
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Since the entire structure of black community had been destroyed in the flood, the 
community could only be rebuilt slowly as little help arrived from whites in Louisville. 
The loss of jobs that resulted from the flood delayed the rebuild even longer. Much like 
the black community in Tulsa, the self-sufficient city within a city found that rebuilding 
after a disaster brought out the worst among the white citizens. Those whites still 
scrambling to find any sort of employment during the years of the Great Depression 
quickly filled any jobs now available leaving those previously self-employed blacks with 
nowhere to turn to for an occupation. With blacks and whites engaged in cutthroat 
competition for jobs, violence occasionally erupted further heating an already tense 
atmosphere in Louisville.219  
The lean years that followed the 1937 flood gradually improved as the African 
Americans who remained in Louisville rebuilt their homes and businesses. When World 
War II began job opportunities once again appeared for blacks either through service in 
the military or in the openings left behind by whites during their military servic . Still 
housing remained an issue for blacks and those that tried to move out of the area 
prescribed to blacks quickly found out. In a story related by author George C. Wright, a 
white couple bought a house for a black man in the late 1950s in a Louisville 
neighborhood and after his neighbors uncovered the true owner of the home they insisted 
that the home be sold. When the man refused to accede to their demands, an anonymous 
person bombed the home, and the city government arrested the couple for sedition 
efficiently and effectively discouraging anyone else from following the same plan to fight 
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housing discrimination. Blacks who tried to display an increased social standing by 
purchasing homes outside of African-American neighborhoods quickly discovered that 
not only were white citizens opposed to black success, but that government officials also 
resisted the idea that blacks could attain the same status as whites in any way.220   
Much like the politicians in Oklahoma City and Tulsa when they positioned their 
city and state as “progressive” and forward thinking on racial matters, the government 
leaders of Louisville portrayed their city as “liberal” in an effort to at ract businesses 
despite evidence that suggested that prejudices in both cities still remained. The manner 
in which each responded to demands of black equality also mirrored the other. In both 
cities, the government publicly claimed support but refused to back their pronouncements 
with legislation. The hypocrisy also extended to the state governors as well. After the 
Brown v. Board Supreme Court decision, Kentucky governor Lawrence Wetherby 
assured the state’s African Americans that he would, “do whatever is necessary to 
comply with the law.”221 Oklahoma’s governor similarly proclaimed that he would do 
anything demanded him by the government concerning school desegregation.  
In both states, the Brown decision began an increasingly divisive era for black-
white relations. Allowing blacks an education at their own black high schools and 
institutions of higher learning displayed a well-meaning, and indeed “progressive” racial 
agenda, but integration with their own children serving as guinea pigs for a federally- 
initiated program proved to be one step too far for the parents of Louisville. After 
receiving word that a second version of the Supreme Court’s decision would arrive 
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shortly, the city’s board of education tabled the matter for the year and pledged to revisit 
their decision following the further exploration of the country’s highest court.222  
Following the assertions by the governors, the black citizens of each city waited 
to see when and how the implementation of school desegregation would occur. Before 
the passage of Brown, the teachers in black schools in Kentucky were all white because. 
Historian George C. Wright elaborated, “Hiring whites to teach black students was a way 
of ensuring that blacks would be educated in such a way that they would not be likely to 
challenge the white establishment.”223 After the high court’s decision, the situation 
improved only incrementally. Although the desegregation of the schools went by without 
almost any incident, the implementation left something to be desired. The Louisville 
School District allowed for parents to choose where their children would attend school, 
and inevitably the white children tended to remain where they were. Black children who 
attempted to gain access to the formerly all-white schools often met resistance unless 
they exhibited some outstanding or attractive quality that increased the prestige of the 
school they entered. Ultimately, the desegregation decision altered very littl  in terms of 
the racial distribution of students in the Louisville school district. Black and white 
students generally still went to the schools they attended prior to the integration effort.  
The schools showed only token integration in an attempt to mollify black parents fighting 
for equality in their children’s schooling.224 
While the fight continued for equality in schooling, another group decided to meet 
a different facet of segregation head-on. Businesses in Louisville, especially restaurants 
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had racial policies similar to those in Oklahoma. Each store created its own policies on 
segregation. Restaurant owners forced blacks to pick up their meal in the rear of the st re 
or at a separate counter so that their entrance would not offend the store’s white patrons. 
Beginning in 1956, the local chapter of the NAACP Youth Council began sitting in at 
local variety stores to force the owners to give them service. Led by local b a k; Lyman 
Johnson, the variety stores held out for almost six months before they caved to the 
demands of the Youth Council.225  Encouraged by their early successes the group then set 
a larger goal, to end segregation at all public facilities and ensure the passage of a public 
accommodations bill that guaranteed service for blacks at any business in the city. 
Exactly as in Oklahoma City and Tulsa, the mayor and city council rebuffed the group 
and neglected to commit to any demonstrable change in legislative form.226   
Focusing only on the city government ignores the wider range of the racial 
problems that infiltrated Louisville. Louisville advocated the right of blacks to vo e 
beginning in the 1920s. And unlike other Southern cities, locals did not actively prevent 
blacks from participation in the electoral process.227 Much like Oklahoma City, 
Louisville did not have a history of widespread violence concerning the registration of 
black voters. While this should have encouraged blacks in Louisville to vote freely, that 
was rarely the case. Instead, those activists willing to demonstrate for black rights found 
themselves hamstrung by a disinterested community. When the Louisville Youth Council 
resumed sit-ins at a local Walgreens drugstore in 1958, the lack of community support, 
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relegated the activism to a brief sputter in the city’s history rather than a clear step 
forward for the movement.228  
Eventually, the NAACP Youth Council gained allies in the form of CORE in 
addition to the increasing amenability of both black and white activists who remained 
unaffiliated with any specific organization. Even with the support gained by the Youth 
Council, activism in Louisville still lacked the traction necessary to create a public 
accommodations ordinance. While the Youth Council no longer worried about a rivalry 
from the local CORE chapter, the small number of CORE members could do little to help 
the Council in terms of large-scale activism. Rather than providing a major boost to the 
civil rights cause, the elimination of the antagonism just offered some sense of unity 
among the civil rights organizations in the city. Indeed, the rapprochement of CORE and 
the Youth Council only eliminated a distraction rather than providing a tangible 
advancement of the cause in the city.  
Despite the continuous series of obstacles being placed in their path, the 
determination of the members of the Youth Council and other Louisville activists would 
not let the failure of their previous efforts prevent the continuation of the movement. 
After the announcement of a showing of the film Porgy and Bess at the local Brown 
Theater at the end of 1959, the members uncovered their next opportunity for fighting 
segregation in the city. The film, based on the George Gershwin opera of the same name, 
focused on the struggles of African-American characters, and the inability of the black 
students to view the picture illustrated the cruel irony of being black in the middle 
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decades of the twentieth century. The group challenged the theater by having two 
members protesting each showing of the film at the venue. In an effort to lend their effort 
a more official basis, several students met with the city’s mayor during a re ularly 
scheduled community dialogue meeting and vented their frustration with the lack of  
public accommodations ordinance in Louisville. Despite the response from the mayor,
the rebuffed protestors returned to their previous methods at the theater. Once agai the 
Youth Council along with fellow supporters from a local church group, the Unitarians for 
Social Action, failed to discourage the theater from showing the film, but did not nitia e 
any major legislative action either.229 
After years of activism, the civil rights organizations finally realized their ultimate 
goal when the Kentucky governor passed a public accommodations ordinance in 1963. 
The final step reflected the similarities between Kentucky and Oklahoma as much as the 
genesis of the movement resembled the other only a decade earlier. Only with the 
passage of statewide legislation did any of the cities, Oklahoma City, Tulsaor 
Louisville, become truly open to African Americans. Legislation only represent d the 
final step in the process for the civil rights activists in each city. The passage of a law 
received attention for its significance, but the development would never have emerged 
except for the direct action practices of the Youth Council. The primary factors that 
reflected the similar histories of civil rights in these three cities include the early genesis 
of active demonstrations in each, and the youthfulness of a sizable number of the 
movement’s major contributors. Under the strong leadership of a determined adult 
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sponsor the Youth Council and other young activists forced the city and state 
governments to respond, even if the response garnered was not what the activists hoped 
to hear.  
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 By the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, significant change had been 
generated in Oklahoma City politics. Spurred on by the actions of the NAACP Youth
Council and their allies in fighting segregation, the Oklahoma City City Council, “Went 
on record for the first time officially as opposed to discrimination based on race, ceed or 
color.”230 Perhaps an even bigger victory came with from the legislation that preceded it.  
As Jimmy Stewart wrote in The Black Dispatch, “This follows closely on the heels of a 
similar bill, SB 273, passed by our state senate recently, 34-0, which officially declared 
the state policy as opposed to segregation.”231 The announcement provided a welcome 
assurance of support for the black community that had been shot down only a few years 
previously. The government finally passed the type of legislation that the Black Dispatch 
hoped for a decade earlier when it declared, “What we really need in Oklahoma is a civil 
rights law which requires all persons who operate public facilities to give uniform 
treatment to all American citizens who enter their doors. It is going to take the 
underpinning of law to give minority groups in America the substantial guarantees of the 
constitution.”232 With the law now supporting them, the activists reveled in the 
accomplishment of their initial goal. Without a central goal, the civil rights movements in 
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Oklahoma City and Tulsa fractured as activists found specific areas to focus their efforts 
upon.  
One particular area, the struggle for school desegregation, continued to attract the 
attention of activists into the mid-1970s as government officials failed to implement a 
system that generated a timely course of action in Oklahoma City. Unhappy with the 
school board’s promises about future school integration, Dr. A. L. Dowell tried to enroll 
his son at high school not assigned to their neighborhood. His son, who attended the all-
black Douglass High School, attempted to take an electronics course not offered by his 
school at the all-white Northeast High School.  The failure to develop a suitable pln to 
allow his son to take the course led Dowell to sue the Board of Education, Superintendent 
of Schools Jack Parker, and Assistant Superintendent Merle Burr in 1961. Accusing the 
defendants of running a “qualified biracial school district,” Dowell resorted to legal 
means to rectify the situation. The case, delayed by multiple appeals from the school 
system, continued until 1967 when Judge Luther Bohanon ordered the district to find an 
operable plan for desegregating the schools. Bohanon stated in his decision, 
 
“This litigation has been frustratingly interminable, not because of insuperable  
difficulties of implementation of the commands of the Supreme Court of the  
United States, but because of the unpardonable recalcitrance of the Defendant  
School Board and the Superintendant of Schools to come forward with a 
constitutional plan for the desegregation of the schools of this District.”233 
 
The Oklahoma City school districts previously adopted the Cluster Plan for 
integrating schools. This plan made each school have a sister school based on proximity 
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to the student’s residence. Each student attended the school closest to their home for the 
majority of their classes. If the school failed to offer a course that the stud nt wished to 
take, the student could attend the sister school for that class but for only that class. Once 
the student completed the course they returned to their primary school for the remaind r 
of their classes. This new plan adopted by the school district derived its name from its 
originator, Dr. John Finger. The Finger Plan developed new groupings for the schools in 
the Oklahoma City system and also changed the areas from which the city’s high schools 
received their students. 234 However, it became increasingly clear by the end of the 1970-
1971 school year that the new plan had the same problems as the old, a school board and 
superintendent uninterested in desegregating the schools. Despite the pleading of the 
school districts that they obeyed the court’s earlier ruling, Judge Bohanon declare  th t 
the case once again would be discussed. The primary reasoning behind the 
recommencing of the proceedings came from enrollment statistics that showed that, “65 
of the city’s 110 schools were at least 99 percent white or 99 percent black.”235 
The plan would finally be implemented by the school district in 1973. Still some 
people did not see this as a significant victory over segregated schooling.236 One 
anonymous individual commented that, “Those affluent persons who still live here, even 
the cocktail party liberals, are sending their youngsters to private schools, so they don’t 
care.”237 This problem had existed since the government first confirmed its acceptance of 
school desegregation. Governor J. Howard Edmondson transferred all three of his 
children to an all-white school district claiming, “his children had made friends at an ll-
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white high school before he moved into the Governor’s mansion.”238 Regardless of the 
truth of the statement, the facts still existed that, “The system is working this: If you are 
white and live in an integrated school district you can transfer to an all-white sc ool 
district with no delay. On the other hand, if you are a Negro, you can transfer within so-
called Negro districts.” The actions of the governor continued to display the duplicitous 
nature of the major players behind settlements. Whites followed one set of rules, whi 
blacks did not receive equal consideration. The issue of government officials claiming 
support for initiatives that gave blacks more rights and then failing to implement them 
was demonstrated again here, and continued to be a common occurrence for at least two 
decades after the passage of Brown.239  
The geographical arrangement of blacks and whites in Oklahoma City clearly 
affected the initial acceptance of those in power in government of the Brown decision. 
Blacks typically did not live near whites within the city limits or on the outskirts of the 
city. A clear division existed between black parts of town, and white parts of town. 
Discrimination could still be seen on even a neighborhood-to-neighborhood basis. 
Perhaps more mystifying the situation did not seem to be rectified even after the passage 
of civil rights acts and President Johnson’s housing initiatives. In fact, the situation 
actually seemed to be getting worse. Specific neighborhoods went from being partially 
integrated to being enclaves for separate ethnicities. Whites evacuated neighborhoods as 
they saw blacks buying houses as the first step towards falling property values. 
Frequently, when a certain percentage of blacks entered a neighborhood, a “tipping 
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point” occurred and whites moved out. As whites moved out and other blacks filled the 
newly vacant homes, the neighborhoods effectively become resegregated. When laws a d 
official policies no longer existed to enforce segregation, the decisions of homeowners 
reinforced the status quo that had been in place since African Americans first attempted 
to move in to previously all-white neighborhood. While legislation did not dictate who 
could live in certain areas, the decisions of homeowners prevented integration from 
occurring on a large-scale basis.240  
The Oklahoma City sit-in movement failed to attract the attention of the nation for 
several reasons. The first and likely best explanation for the lack of coverage of the 
events outside of Oklahoma is that the state and city government officials desired to 
showcase the state as a progressive state. The officials envisioned the state as an up-and-
coming municipal area, and being known as a bastion of racism would obviously subvert 
their attempts at improving the state’s image. Having such an image would also ikely 
discourage national businesses from expanding corporate headquarters or branches to 
Oklahoma. Governor Henry Bellmon even appealed to the closest thing to many 
businessmen’s heart, the pocketbook, when he addressed their concerns; “We’ve found 
that industries will not locate in communities where segregation exists. I think we are 
going to see a change in these community leaders viewpoint when they see how 




Civil rights in Tulsa faced a different challenge than the one in Oklahoma City. 
The race riot in the 1920s cemented the black community in North Tulsa. After its near 
destruction, the Greenwood neighborhood understandably barricaded itself. Hoping to 
ensure their survival, the action succeeded in preserving the neighborhood at the cost of 
almost complete isolation for African Americans in Tulsa. This pleased those whites that 
believed in the separation of races. Unbeknownst to the remaining African Americans in 
Tulsa, the isolation intended as a defense mechanism would be the same thing that they 
struggled to escape thirty years later. The struggle to emerge from the ruins of the riot 
and the subsequent era of racial restrictions caused black Tulsans to refer to the fact that 
their hometown, “still qualifies as the most segregated city in the world.”242  
As the sit-ins in Oklahoma City gradually overturned segregationist policies, 
Tulsa’s citizens prepared for the demonstrations to move north into their city. Like 
Oklahoma City the reactions of Tulsans displayed a variety of opinions concerning the 
actions of the NAACP Youth Council. Some, content with the current rate of progress, 
saw little need to follow the example illustrated in Oklahoma City. One Tulsa woman, 
Janene McGuire elaborated, “Integration is progressing in Tulsa in a natural and quiet 
way…We have nice colored people in Tulsa who never cause trouble; let’s not let it start 
now.”243  Others voiced the opposite opinion and called for increased activity by Tulsa’s 
blacks. The Reverend William C. King provided this perspective, “Until the conscience 
of the people of Tulsa is sufficiently awakened to give the Negro equal rights, then let’s 
have more demonstrations-more sit-ins.”244 The responses of some of Tulsa’s citizens 
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attacked the movement in its entirety. One individual wrote an excoriating letter to he 
editor of the Tulsa World vilifying all of the participants in the demonstrations, “It seems 
these people don’t choose to earn what they desire; they want selfish laws passed giving 
them what they haven’t cared to earned.” The letter’s author continued, “It’ll always be 
nature and that’s God’s will at work, for people to seek their own peers.”245  Despite all 
the differing opinions of Tulsa citizens on race and potential future demonstrations, the 
citizens knew that the movement that Oklahoma City experienced would eventually 
spread to Tulsa. The rapidity at which change was accomplished in Tulsa can be linked to 
directly to the influence of the Oklahoma City sit-ins. Clara Luper provided a l ader 
experienced in both demonstration activities and recruiting techniques. However, by the 
time that the movement reached Tulsa volunteers for the sit-ins left little need for 
recruitment. This resulted in the early focus in Tulsa being on gaining supporters f civil 
rights from those individuals that refrained from active participation.    
Both Oklahoma City and Tulsa experienced decidedly different movements 
towards achieving civil rights than other Southern states. Of CORE, SNCC, and the 
SCLC, the emergent organizations that keyed many of the successful efforts thr ughout 
the South, only CORE achieved any semblance of influence, and primarily acted 
supporting role to Clara Luper and the Oklahoma City NAACP Youth Council. The fact 
that Luper played the key role in the Oklahoma City movement in itself signaled a unique 
aspect of civil rights in Oklahoma City simply because the primary leader and organizer 
of the sit-ins was a woman. Black males, often Baptist preachers, typically took the 
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leadership role throughout the Southern civil rights movements and managed an older 
cohort of volunteer activists than what Luper typically directed in her efforts. In a distinct 
difference from the Southern movement, the civil rights movement in Oklahoma received 
little support from the church. While some pastors and parishioners gave freely of their
time and money, the city’s churches made no concerted effort offering their help to the 
movement. The reluctance of some pastors to advocate the movement could be linked the 
mixed feelings within each congregation about the non-violent direct action methods that 
the civil rights groups were using. However, a more in depth study of the sentiments 
behind the pastors refusing to champion the civil rights activities within the state.     
The people of Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Louisville all maintained distinctively 
Southern attitudes towards race during the decade examined, but each was located in a 
border state. Each city found itself struggling to reconcile its current racial attitude with 
its cultural heritage. While individuals from each state certainly fought for the South 
during the Civil War, others fought for the Union. Without a definitive link to the 
Confederacy, the view of race remained muddled in the border states. Jumping to 1954-
1964, the time period covered in this thesis, views on race had changed but the end result 
was still similar. Whites in Oklahoma, Kentucky, and other border states around the 
country still maintained confused and often uncertain attitudes concerning blacks. When 
the Brown Supreme Court Decision was handed down, Oklahoma’s government officials 
reacted in a calm and measured manner. But, in the period after the initial public react on, 
the more honest opinions on the decision began to seep out. Officials voiced their 
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concerns about budget issues and the feasibility of integration, while white parents 
explored options to keep their children from ending up at an overwhelmingly black 
school. Ultimately, painting the government or citizens as racist simplifes a multifaceted 
issue into something inaccurate. Many individuals struggled with their own sentiments 
about African Americans and these ideas often evolved as whites became more 
comfortable with the possibility of integrated schools, public facilities, and governments.  
This uncertainty about their own feelings concerning race cannot be linked solely 
to the cities in border states. While the South was demonized by many public figures for 
the gross displays of racial violence aired upon television screens across the nation, the 
region’s people were often linked with the most despicable and violent of the racists in 
the South. Though common throughout the South, the racism that captured the attention 
of the nation erupted from those individuals, sheriffs, police officers and Ku Klux Klan 
members that represented the worst of the South. In addition, these individuals failed to 
understand the nation’s developing news media. Civil rights leaders, whose decades of 
verbal protests had resulted in little government intervention, benefitted from the 
increasing use of video cameras by media outlets.  Police officers unleashing violent 
attack dogs provided an image that burned deeply into the psyche of the nation. However, 
Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Louisville never came close to dealing with reactions as 
violent as those in Deep South. Why is this? With a similar view on race as the Sout, 
why would the reactions to Civil Rights demonstrations in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and 
Louisville be so drastically different from those throughout the region? Indeed, the sit-ins 
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in the border cities witnessed an almost opposite reaction than those throughout the Deep 
South. Even if civil rights organizations specifically chose cities based upon the 
likelihood of a violent response by local authorities, why was a similar response n t en 
in the border cities?  
The first reason behind the tempered reaction in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and 
Louisville lies in the concerned reactions by the business owners whose stores were 
targeted first. The small demonstrations were each localized to a lunch counter r dining 
room of a particular store, limiting the provocation of the general public. Rather than a
city-wide march down one of the primary arteries of the city, the protesting groups 
respectfully entered and requested service at the store. Whereas the major Southe n 
demonstrations intended to spur a violent reaction, these sit-ins provided defiance 
displayed in a different manner. The groups in each city dealt with of store managers 
denying service, threats from other patrons, and scattered violent acts during thei 
demonstrations, but the protestor’s refusal to respond in kind defused these situations as 
much as possible. In addition, the stores location in majority black sections of each city 
forced the hands of the business owners. The economic reprisal ensured by boycottsof 
specific stores that refused to give equal treatment to blacks left storeowners with no 
choice but to serve blacks if they wanted to remain profitable.  Left with the options of 
integrating their business, facing a boycott that could put the store out of business, or 
moving to another location, storeowners capitulated to the demands of the African-
American community.  
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Unlike the situation in the Deep South, blacks found themselves in a greater 
position of power in the three border cities of Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Louisville. Each 
city had distinctive residential and business areas where almost the entire black 
population lived, worked, and attended school. Even though decades long practices of 
racial intolerance and de facto segregation had forced blacks into small section of the 
city, these unofficial policies created largely self-sufficient communities within the larger 
city. Without a dependence on white-owned businesses that refused to integrate, blacks 
could more effectively challenge segregation policies simply because they had the option 
to go to another store that supported their cause. Another difference that distances border 
states from the Deep South was the ability of blacks to vote. Throughout the South blacks 
were routinely disenfranchised to the extent that some counties in Alabama nd 
Mississippi had never had a black vote in an election. In border states no one prevented 
blacks from voting. Instead motivating blacks to register and vote became the major 
issue. The tensions in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Louisville were lessened because 
voting provided blacks with another avenue for generating change beyond sit-ins or other 
types of demonstrations.  
This study was intended to supplement the growing trend of community studies in 
civil rights literature. While Southern communities have been studied extensively in this 
manner, border states are often ignored. By contrasting three cities in two different states 
that had largely been ignored, I intended to provide an entry point for further studies of 
each of these states. The importance of this thesis lies in the differences between these 
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cities and those in the Deep South or north during the civil rights era. Both the Deep 
South and the North had characteristics that distinguished it from the movement in the 
other region. However, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Louisville display a mélange of 
influences that make it impossible to easily place any of these cities squarely in either one 
of these commonly accepted regions. The unique qualities of this thesis arise from not 
only the distinctive attributes of each city, but also from the commonalities that link them 
as a major component of a border state.  
In Oklahoma, local and state officials generally implemented a more modrate 
approach to civil rights reform than their counterparts in the South and the official’s 
willingness to obey federal legislation demonstrated the state’s intention to become the 
state within the region that contained forward-thinking and progressive policies 
concerning race relations. This attitude, present from Governor Johnston Murray’s 
embrace of the of the Brown decision, helped shape the stance that the state would take 
on civil rights legislation from 1954 to 1964. However, it became increasingly clear that 
after the initial claims of government officials that they would obey the decisions handed 
down by both national and local courts, that a policy of gradualism would be enacted 
when it came time to implement that court’s decisions.  
School and government officials at both a local and state level all displayed a 
disinterest in the quick implementation promised in achieving African-American 
equality. Though research does not suggest that any collaborative effort ever exist d, 
each group separately and unequivocally exercised similar policies concerning civil 
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rights. Despite these delayed efforts, when coupled with the mostly cordial relationships 
between the overwhelmingly white police force and the black community the reasons for 
the relatively quiet movement become evident. Despite a wide range of opinions about 
the sit-in movement and those who participated in it, the leaders of Oklahoma City 
generally showed a significant measure of restraint when reacting to the demonstrations. 
Time and again potentially violent situations were defused by the respect and deferenc  
displayed by the police, demonstrators, shopkeepers, or city officials. In a matter fraught 
with questions both moral and political, the general level of calm that was maintained is a 
credit to those individuals involved. However, overlooking the arrests, the political 
obstacles, the internal struggles, and the frequent delays demonstrates an incomplete and 
misconstrued understanding of the civil rights struggle in Oklahoma City and Tulsa. Even 
with the participation of both black and white activists it took a decades-long effort for a 
significant measure of progress to be realized. Civil rights legislation finally came to   
Oklahoma in 1963, a year before President Lyndon Johnson authorized the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  
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